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ABSTRACT
Hoque, Md. Endadul PhD, Purdue University, December 2015. Ensuring Specifica-
tion Compliance, Robustness, and Security of Wireless Network Protocols. Major
Professor: Cristina Nita-Rotaru and Sonia Fahmy.
Several newly emerged wireless technologies (e.g., Internet-of-Things, Bluetooth,
NFC)—extensively backed by the tech industry—are being widely adopted and have
resulted in a proliferation of diverse smart appliances and gadgets (e.g., smart ther-
mostat, wearables, smartphones), which has ensuingly shaped our modern digital
life. These technologies include several communication protocols that usually have
stringent requirements stated in their specifications. Failing to comply with such re-
quirements can result in incorrect behaviors, interoperability issues, or even security
vulnerabilities. Moreover, lack of robustness of the protocol implementation to mali-
cious attacks—exploiting subtle vulnerabilities in the implementation—mounted by
the compromised nodes in an adversarial environment can limit the practical utility
of the implementation by impairing the performance of the protocol and can even
have detrimental effects on the availability of the network. Even having a compliant
and robust implementation alone may not suffice in many cases because these tech-
nologies often expose new attack surfaces as well as new propagation vectors, which
can be exploited by unprecedented malware and can quickly lead to an epidemic.
Given the stake associated with these wireless technologies, the requirement to
ensure secure and reliable operations calls for both pre- and post-deployment mecha-
nisms. In this dissertation, we focus on fortifying these emerging technologies along
three dimensions. First, we propose an automatic compliance checking technique
allowing a developer to ensure—before deployment—that the implementation is com-
pliant with the protocol specifications. Second, we develop an automated adversarial
xiii
testing platform to help developers find vulnerabilities in their protocol implemen-
tations prior to deployment, thereby ensuring robustness of the implementations in
adversarial environments. Finally, we devise several countermeasures to mitigate in-
fection in the event of attacks after deployment.
11 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, new wireless technologies have emerged and changed the way we live
and interact with the environment through various devices ranging from tiny smart
objects such as smart home appliances, implantable medical devices, to large com-
puting devices such as automobiles. The devices interact using a variety of methods
including WiFi [1], 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over IEEE 802.15.4 [2]), Bluetooth [3], RFID [4],
near field communication (NFC) [5], Internet-of-Things (IoT) [6]. These networks
have become the foundation of many applications and services that our daily life de-
pends on. Therefore, secure and reliable operations of these emerging networks have
strong impact on our socio-economic life.
Like any traditional networks, the core of these new wireless networks consists of
several communication protocols, which the user applications and services are built
on. Most of these protocols are standardized through explicit specifications, which
are often carefully studied to uncover design flaws and errors. However, many errors
and bugs can be introduced during the implementation phase, which often manifest
after the deployment of the implementation. Errors leading to inconsistent output or
incorrect behaviors cause the implementation fail to comply with its specifications and
thus make it a non-compliant implementation. Therefore, checking only the design
for compliance is not enough. Moreover, checking implementations for compliance is
a painstakingly time-consuming task, which is aggravated due to the increased design
complexity of the protocols and the limited functionalities of existing compliance
checking tools. Therefore, it is imperative to develop automated techniques that
can assist a developer to ensure whether the implementation is complaint with its
specifications prior to deployment.
Despite having an implementation compliant with its specifications, the implemen-
tation may contain vulnerabilities that manifest only at the presence of compromised
2nodes, which can behave arbitrarily and thus mount attacks. Lack of robustness
to such attacks can limit the practical utility of the protocol. Such vulnerabilities
often remain undetected using traditional testing approaches. While such testing
approaches have been shown to be fruitful, they have some significant weaknesses.
For instance, tedious manual testing can easily become exhausting with the increased
complexity of the implementation and leave portion unexplored due to developers’ in-
ability to reason about such cases; similarly, static analysis is inevitably imprecise for
vulnerabilities that manifest only during concrete execution in an adversarial environ-
ment. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure robustness of a protocol implementation
in an adversarial environment before deployment by developing automated testing
techniques to find vulnerabilities in the implementation.
Ensuring security has always been the “arms race” between malware creators
and those seeking to thwart their activities. “Zero day” attacks after deployment
are not unprecedented in case of well-known and widely used protocol implementa-
tions [7, 8], let alone for the protocols developed for the emerging networks [9, 10].
Furthermore, the emerging networks often introduce new attack surfaces as well as
new malware propagation vectors, which can ensue an epidemic from any malware
infection. As a precautionary measure, applying compliance checking and adversar-
ial testing techniques—separately or in tandem—can help developers safeguard their
protocol implementations from numerous errors and attacks. Nevertheless, for a holis-
tic defense, it is important to investigate countermeasures to mitigate infection in the
event of attacks after deployment.
1.1 Focus and Motivation
In this thesis, we focus on fortifying the emerging wireless networks along three
dimensions. Firstly, we strive to develop automatic compliance checking techniques
aiding developers to ensure that their protocol implementations are complaint with
the respective specifications. Secondly, we aim to develop automatic testing tech-
3niques to help developers find vulnerabilities in their protocol implementations and
thus ensure robustness of the implementations in adversarial environments. Finally,
we intend to devise countermeasures to mitigate infection in the networks as post-
deployment measures.
Compliance checking of network protocol implementations. Finite state
machines (FSM s) are often used to specify stateful network protocols (e.g., Telnet,
DHCP). Such FSMs essentially identify the protocols’ internal states and also indi-
cate under what conditions (e.g., occurrence of an event) the protocols change their
internal states. Such (stateful) network protocols are expected to comply with nu-
merous properties specified in the protocol specification documents such as RFCs.
For instance, a desired property specific to the Telnetd (Telnet server) implemen-
tation for the Contiki [11] operating system1 is: “when the server has an on-going
connected session with a client, any further connection requests should be rejected by
the server”. Failing to adhere to these properties can result in inconsistencies in
the internal states, interoperability issues, incorrect behaviors, or even security vul-
nerabilities. In the above example, if the Telnetd accepts another client connection
when there is already an ongoing client connection, the protocol can misbehave and
affect confidentiality and integrity by sending one client’s (partial) command output
to another. This is a real non-compliance reported in the Contiki forum [12].
Checking protocol implementations for non-compliances is challenging as some of
the non-compliant behaviors of the implemented protocol can only be triggered by
a long and complex sequence of events. Such intricate non-compliant executions can
remain undetected due to the developers’ inability to reason about such cases. Hence,
it is paramount to develop techniques and tools that can assist developers to detect
protocol non-compliances with limited manual effort.
The formal verification community has extensively explored the problem of check-
ing whether a program complies with some invariants [13–18]. Among the existing
1An operating system for Internet-of-Things devices
4work, the work by Holzmann et al. [19] and Musuvathi et al. [18,20] are the most rele-
vant. Holzmann et al. [19] relies heavily on the developer annotations to syntactically
extract the FSM of an event-driven program which is then model checked with some
desired temporal logic properties [21]. Musuvathi et al. [20] develop an explicit-state
model checker for network protocols written in C, but the properties they can check
are limited to only boolean formulas and focused primarily on low-level program-
ming errors. Such techniques are not enough to detect logical programming errors
(called functional properties) introduced while implementing the FSMs described in
the specifications. Therefore, we focus on developing a protocol compliance checking
framework that allows a developer to check whether the implementation complies
with its desired functional properties derived from the RFCs, research papers, and
code documentation.
Adversarial testing of network protocol implementations. While checking
compliance of a network protocol implementation is beneficial to detecting violation
of desired properties, this technique does not necessarily evaluate how robust the
implementation is in an adversarial environment where compromised participant(s)
of the protocol can behave arbitrarily and thereby mount attacks. Such attacks can be
detrimental for protocols that run across several nodes of the network, e.g., dynamic
routing protocols.
Routing is crucial for wireless mesh networks—enabled by technologies like Wi-Fi,
WiMAX—that have emerged as a solution for metropolitan area networks (MAN) to
provide the last-few-miles connectivity. As traditional routing protocols do not per-
form well in a resource-constrained environment like wireless networks in general, a
significant volume of work has been put into designing routing protocols for wireless
networks [22–26]. Given the importance of routing as a fundamental component
of wireless networks, many protocols have been subjected to model checking the de-
sign [27] and to testing the simulator-based implementations [28, 29]. While model
checking helps to verify the validity of the design, it cannot conclude that the actual
5implementation is free of bugs and vulnerabilities since implementations contain op-
timizations not captured by the model. Some optimizations even diverge from the
design and thus introduce new bugs. In addition, while simulators provide easier and
simpler ways to evaluate a protocol, they sacrifice some aspects of realism such as the
interaction of the protocol with the components of the operating system.
Recent research [30–32] showed the importance of performing adversarial test-
ing (i.e., testing systems implementations beyond just basic functionality such as
examining edge cases, boundary conditions, and ultimately conducting destructive
testing) for message-passing distributed systems. Adversarial testing makes proto-
cols more robust to arbitrary and extreme conditions and can discover vulnerabilities
in implementations, many of which might have not occurred in simulator-based imple-
mentations. Previous work related to wireless routing implementations has focused
exclusively on performance comparison across protocols [33–35] or on evaluating per-
formance of TCP in multihop ad hoc networks [33, 36]. Therefore, it is important
to ensure the robustness of a protocol implementation in an adversarial environment
by finding bugs and vulnerabilities that can limit the practical utility of the im-
plementation. In this thesis, we focus on automated adversarial testing of actual
implementations of wireless routing protocols.
Infection mitigation. While proactive measures like compliance checking and ad-
versarial testing augment the inventory of pre-deployment prevention mechanisms,
reactive measures are required to address the aftermath of “zero-day” attacks, which
are not unheard of in communication networks, especially, the Internet. In fact, with
the advent of smartphones and Internet-of-Things, the number of wireless devices with
complex capabilities has significantly increased. While the openness of such wireless
devices—supported by operating systems like Google’s Android [37], Contiki [11],
FreeRTOS [38]—induces developers’ motivation, it also introduces new propagation
vectors for mobile malware. Recent reports show a significant increase of malware
targeting Android devices [39–41] and IoT devices [42–44]. The most prominent mal-
6ware propagation vectors include installation of malicious applications (apps) from
third party app stores, as well as SMSs and emails with URL links tricking users to
download malicious applications. However, the spread of malware through proximity-
based communication has not left un-attempted. Recent incidents [9, 45–47] provide
evidences of malware propagation using short-range communication such as WiFi,
Bluetooth or NFC.
Significant research focused on modeling infection propagation, detection, and ap-
plication profiling of malware in the context of wired networks [48–52]. Those results
do not model mobile malware that spreads directly from device to device by using
short-range communication. Therefore, we focus on investigating the propagation
model of mobile malware amongst humans carrying smartphones and design counter-
measures to mitigate the propagation of mobile malware under a practical scenario.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis, we contribute towards providing specification compliance, robust-
ness, and security of emerging wireless networks through (a) checking compliance of
protocol implementations with their specifications, (b) performing adversarial testing
on the implementations to find vulnerabilities prior to deployment, and (c) miti-
gating infection in case of epidemic outbreak in the network after deployment. We
summarize our key contributions as follows:
• We present a framework, CHIRON, that can check a network protocol source
for compliance with standards and requirements collected from RFCs, academic
papers, and documentation. We develop a technique that automatically ex-
tracts the FSM from the source code of a stateful, event-driven protocol with
minimal developer assistance. A two-step validation process to rule out false
non-compliance protocol executions is also developed. We show the applicability
of CHIRON by testing 5 real protocol implementations from two different net-
work stacks—uIP of Contiki [53], FNET [54]—against 18 protocol requirements
7and uncover 10 instances of non-compliances, several of which have security
implications.
• We develop Turret-W, a platform for automated adversarial testing of wireless
routing protocols. Turret-W can test not only general attacks against rout-
ing, but also wireless specific attacks such as blackhole and wormhole attacks.
Demonstrating Turret-W on publicly available implementations of five represen-
tative routing protocols, we (re-)discovered 37 attacks and 3 bugs. To the best
of our knowledge, all these bugs and 5 of the total attacks were not previously
reported.
• We model the propagation of mobile malware amongst humans carrying smart-
phones using epidemiology theory and study the problem as a function of the
underlying mobility models. We define the optimal approach to heal an infected
system with the help of a set of static healers (nodes that distribute patches) as
the T-Cover problem and show that it is NP-Complete. We then propose
three families of healer protocols that allow for a trade-off between the recovery
time and the energy consumed for deploying patches.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. We present our compliance checking
approach in Chapter 2. Our adversarial testing tool is described in Chapter 3. We
next describe how we mitigate infection propagation in the network in Chapter 4. We
present the related work in Chapter 5 and conclude the thesis in Chapter 6.
82 COMPLIANCE CHECKING OF NETWORK PROTOCOL
IMPLEMENTATIONS
Stateful network protocols are often specified using finite state machines (FSMs),
which identify the protocols’ internal states and indicate under what conditions (e.g.,
occurrence of an event) the protocols change their internal states. We call such a
specification FSM of a protocol an S-FSM. Fig. 2.1(a) shows the S-FSM of the
Telnet server protocol (i.e., Telnetd). Such (stateful) network protocols are often re-
quired to comply with some requirements (also known as properties) according to their
specifications (e.g., RFCs). An example requirement specific to the Telnetd imple-
mentation for the Contiki [11] operating system is: “when the server has an on-going
connected session with a client, any further connection requests should be rejected by
the server”. Failing to adhere to the desired properties can result in inconsistencies
in the internal states, interoperabilities, incorrect behaviors, or even security vulnera-
bilities. In the above example, if the Telnetd accepts another client connection when
there is already an ongoing client connection, the protocol can misbehave by sending
one client’s (partial) command output to another client, thereby affecting confiden-
tiality and integrity. This is a real non-compliance which we have detected using our
approach and is also confirmed by a bug report filed by a developer in the Contiki
forum [12]. The code snippet shown in Fig. 2.2 illustrates the bug in the implemented
Telnetd for Contiki. At line 8 of the code snippet, the protocol moves to the normal
state whenever its gets a new connection without additionally checking whether there
is already an established connection, and this causes the non-compliance.
Checking protocol implementations for non-compliances with their specifications
is challenging as it often requires an intricate sequence of network events to manifest
such non-compliances using traditional testing approaches. Some previous works [13–



























(b) E-FSM of the Telnetd protocol imple-
mented for Contiki-2.4
Figure 2.1.: FSMs of the Telnetd protocol. (a) We follow the event/action convention
when labeling transitions. The character ‘-’ denotes an empty action. The prefix TC
indicates a received Telnet command. TCANY signifies any character other than
(DO, DONT, WILL, WONT). consume data means the application consumes what
has been received as normal data. (b) For ease of exposition, we do not show the
transition labels of the E-FSM.
1 ... /* Omitted */
2 /* Protocol event dispatcher function */
3 void telnetd_appcall (void *ts)
4 {
5 if(uip_connected () /* Got a new connection? */ ) {
6 /* An FSM Bug can manifest here */
7 s.bufptr = 0;
8 s.state = STATE NORMAL;
9 ... /* initialize buffer pointers */




Figure 2.2.: Code snippet from Telnetd implementation for Contiki-2.4
invariants. However, their reliance on syntactic approaches, their restricted form
of properties, or their intention of focusing on low-level programming errors make
them limited to be applied to detect logical programming errors (called functional
properties) introduced while implementing the S-FSMs described in specifications.
In this work, we present CHIRON1, a protocol compliance checking framework
that allows a user to check whether a stateful, event-driven network protocol imple-
1In Greek mythology, Chiron was considered to be the wisest centaur amongst his brethren.
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mentation in C complies with its desired properties derived manually from the RFCs,
research papers, and documentation. CHIRON, in spirit, follows the high level ap-
proach of counterexample-guided abstraction refinement (CEGAR) [55]. CHIRON
reasons about a protocol’s compliance without making any restrictive assumptions
about the underlying network stack or the behavior of the other protocol partici-
pants. The heart of CHIRON is an FSM Extractor that takes as input a couple of
configuration files provided by the developer and the C source code of the implemented
protocol. By leveraging symbolic execution [56], the FSM Extractor automatically ex-
tracts an approximated FSM of the implemented protocol. We refer to the extracted
FSM from the protocol source as the E-FSM.
Automatically extracting an E-FSM that is suitable for compliance checking is
challenging. Due to the many possible states and transitions, manually deriving
the E-FSM from the source is an error-prone and time-consuming process. Fig.
2.1(b) shows the E-FSM (6 states and 84 transitions) automatically extracted by
CHIRON from the Telnetd source for Contiki. Existing work has looked at inferring
protocol FSMs— based on network traces [57–59], using program analysis [60,61], or
through model checking [14, 62]. While network trace-based approaches often suffer
from incompleteness due to inadequate number of traces, others focus on extracting
a sequence of messages valid in a session or the low-level program FSM instead of
the protocol E-FSM. For compliance checking, however, it is required to have an
E-FSM that precisely captures the relevant details.
Once we have the E-FSM, we use a symbolic model checker to check whether the
E-FSM complies with the requirements given by the user. We consider requirements
that are written as propositional linear temporal logic (pLTL) formulas [21]. If the
E-FSM does not comply with a requirement, then the model checker outputs a
counterexample (i.e., an execution of the protocol) as evidence. Due to abstractions
in our analysis, the provided counterexample (in short, CEX) may not be realizable in
an actual execution of the protocol. Therefore, we use a two-step validation process
to rule out unrealizable CEXs.
11
Since CHIRON does not make any assumption about the other protocol par-
ticipants while extracting the E-FSM, one advantage of such an approach is that
CHIRON can aid in composable reasoning. Specifically it can enable us to reason
about the global properties of a two-party protocol by composing their individual
E-FSMs. This is also very relevant in reasoning about protocols designed for dis-
tributed systems. In addition, due to the modular nature of our approach, different
verification tools and techniques can be easily incorporated in CHIRON as pluggable
components.
Our technique of extracting the E-FSM is of independent interest. Some ex-
isting work employs fuzz testing for finding vulnerabilities in protocol implementa-
tions. To overcome the inherent coverage problem of fuzz testing, several works like
SNOOZE [63], KiF [64], and SNAKE [65] rely on user provided S-FSMs. Addi-
tionally, the extracted E-FSM can be visually checked against the S-FSM to spot
missing or spurious transitions without requiring any verification.
CHIRON can also be used as a debugging tool for developers to find missing/un-
wanted state transitions in the E-FSM. Moreover, the E-FSM can be used to per-
form counterexample driven model-based testing [66,67] of a protocol implementation.
Finally, our general analysis technique can easily be adopted in other contexts where
the implementation is also written in an event-driven fashion, e.g., Android UI testing.
We have implemented CHIRON and applied it to a total of 5 implementations of
two different protocols– Telnet server protocol (Telnetd) and DHCP client protocol
(DHCPc) – from two separate TCP/IP network stacks: uIP [53] (part of Contiki)
and FNET [54]. Contiki is a widely used open source operating system that runs
on Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, e.g., smart home appliances [68]. FNET is a
network stack actively maintained by Freescale Semiconductor Inc., which supports
various microcontroller units (MCUs) used in a wide range of applications including
IoT devices, health-care, and vehicular control systems [69]. We use 11 representative
properties for Telnetd and 7 for DHCPc derived from their RFCs, documentation,
and/or bug reports. During compliance checking of these 5 implementations, we
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discovered 10 non-compliance instances in total. One of these non-compliances has
security implications while others can hinder interoperability and possibly impair
performance. Although our technique is general enough to be applicable to other
network protocols, in our evaluation, we particularly focus on protocol implementa-
tions for Contiki and FNET as they are widely used by IoT devices but have not been
extensively studied. To summarize, this work makes the following contributions:
• We present a framework, CHIRON, that can check a network protocol source
for compliance with standards and requirements collected from RFCs, academic
papers, and documentation.
• We develop a technique that automatically extracts the E-FSM from the source
code of a stateful, event-driven protocol with minimal developer assistance.
• We develop a two-step validation process to rule out false non-compliance pro-
tocol executions.
• We also present optimizations that make the E-FSM extraction and compliance
checking efficient.
• We show the applicability of CHIRON by testing 5 real protocol implementa-
tions from two different network stacks— uIP of Contiki, FNET—against 18
protocol requirements. We demonstrate the efficacy of CHIRON experimen-
tally, and in the process, we uncover 10 non-compliances, several of which have
security implications.
2.1 Background
In this section, we briefly review the background materials necessary to understand
our technical contributions.
Finite state machine (FSM). A finite state machine in our setting, denoted by
M , is a tuple 〈Q,Ev,A,Vc, qI , R〉. Q represents a finite set of states q0, . . . , qn and
qI ∈ Q represents the initial state of the finite state machine M . We use Ev to
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denote a set of events (e.g., receive) whereas we use A to denote a set of actions
(e.g., send ack) the protocol can perform. We assume Ev ∩ A = ∅. We also have
a finite set of conditional variables Vc which is disjoint from both the sets Ev and
A. The set R represents the transition relation and R ⊆ Q × Ev × C × 2A × Q
where the condition C represents a set of transition conditions and each element of
which is a quantifier-free first-order logic formula over variables Vc. If Vc = {x, y},
then an example transition condition can be x ≥ 0 ∧ x + y 6= 10 where each atomic
formula of the transition condition (e.g., x ≥ 0) is called an atom. Given a transition
〈qa, receive, uip len[0, (2B)] 6= 0∧payload[0, (1B)] = 255, {send ack}, qb〉, it signifies that
if the FSM is currently at state qa, the event receive is triggered, the receive buffer is
not empty (i.e., receive buffer length is not equal to zero), and payload’s first byte is
255, then the FSM can move to a new state qb and can take the action send ack. We
use FSMs to abstractly represent the high level operation of a protocol.
Propositional Linear temporal logic (pLTL). Propositional linear temporal
logic (in short, pLTL) extends propositional logic with temporal operators [21]. We
use pLTL to express the desired properties a protocol should have. There are two
kinds of temporal operators: past temporal operators and future temporal operators.
pLTL reasons about relative temporal ordering of states/events without considering
the explicit time at which each event/state happens. The past temporal operators are:
 (read “once”, it means that the formula following the operator was true at some
point of time in the past including the current time point),  (read “historically”, it
means the formula following the operator has been true all along in the past including
the current time point), (read “yesterday” which signifies that the following formula
was true in the immediate previous step), and S (read “since”, is a binary operator
and ϕ1 S ϕ2 is true in the current state if ϕ2 was once true in the past, possibly
in the current state, and ϕ1 has been true since then till the current state.). The
future operators  (read “eventually”),  (read “henceforth”),  (read “next”),
and U (read “until”) are duals of the past operators. The atomic elements of a
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pLTL formula is an atomic proposition which is a drawn from a finite set P . which in
our case is P = Q∪A∪E∪T where T is a set and each element of T is a proposition
denoting the truth value of an atom. A pLTL formula ϕ can be inductively defined
as: ϕ ::= true | p | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ¬ϕ | ϕ | ϕ | ϕ | ϕ1 S ϕ2 | ϕ | ϕ | ϕ | ϕ1 U ϕ2
where p ∈ P . pLTL formulas are interpreted over infinite traces generated by a kripke
structure or in our case a finite state machine of form M , each element of which is
a state that maps each proposition in P to either true or false. For example, the
formula (receive ∧ receivedPacketIsACK → send data) specifies that whenever we
receive an acknowledgement of a packet receive it implies that we have send a packet
at some point of time in the past. The formal semantics of pLTL is standard and can
be found elsewhere (cf. [21]).
Event-driven protocol implementation. A protocol can be implemented in
plethora of ways. As a first cut in our context, we consider protocols implemented
only in the event-driven paradigm. In the event-driven style of protocol implemen-
tation, the protocol has internal states which is altered with respect to different
network events. For each event, the protocol has specific handling code that performs
the necessary protocol state transition when that event occurs. The logic behind
the transition of states with respect to a given event is protocol dependent. Let us
consider the very simple protocol skeleton in Figure 2.3. In this protocol, there are
three possible events: CONN (referring to a connection attempt), RECV (referring to
receiving of new data), and CLOSE (referring to the termination of the connection).
The main function waits for an event to occur and calls the dispatch event function
which based on the different types of events, calls its appropriate handling code that
performs necessary state transitions.
Symbolic execution (SE). Symbolic execution (SE ) is a program analysis tech-
nique which is used to generate program inputs such that it is possible to test dif-
ferent execution paths to attain a high level of coverage during testing. SE as the
name suggests considers program input variables to have symbolic values and then it
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1 // List of events
2 enum{CONN = 0, RECV , CLOSE , ...};
3 void dispatch_event(int ev){
4 switch(ev){
5 case CONN:

























Figure 2.3.: A simple protocol implemented in event-driven paradigm
symbolically executes the program with those value. Special care is given in handling
conditional branches (i.e., if-else, loops). While symbolically executing the program
whenever a conditional branch is encountered, SE first checks see to whether both
the condition and its negation are satisfiable, if this the case, SE explores both paths
in the program due to the branch but adds the branch condition (resp., its negation)
as the constraint of that path. This is called the path constraint or path condition.
When new branches are encountered, they are added to the current path constraint
with conjunction. When a desired program location or the end of the program is
reached, SE consults a SMT solver to solve the path constraint and obtain concrete
values for the input variables for which the path is taken.
Consider the simple function foo presented in Figure 2.4. Let us assume x and
y are the function’s input variables. Let us also assume that they have the symbolic
value αx and αy. After executing line 5, variables x, y, and z have values αx+αy+1,
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αy, and 0, respectively. In line 6, the condition x ≥ 5 is encountered, in which case
SE consults the SMT solver to check whether the constraints αx + αy + 1 ≥ 5 and
αx + αy + 1 < 5 are both satisfiable. If this is the case, SE adds the constraint
αx + αy + 1 ≥ 5 to the path condition of the execution where the if branch is taken
and conversely adds αx + αy + 1 < 5 to the path condition of the execution which
takes the else branch. When the execution terminates, SE again consults the SMT
solver to obtain a concrete value for each symbolic variable. For the execution that
took the if branch, SE consults the SMT solver to obtain concrete values for αx and
αy such that the path condition αx + αy + 1 ≥ 5 is true. The output of the SMT
solver (i.e., the concrete values) can be used as the program input, which will drive
the execution to take the if branch. This process is carried out by SE for each of the
execution paths of the program.
1 void foo(){
2 int x = input();
3 int y = input();
4 int z = 0;
5 x = x + y + 1;
6 if(x >= 5 ){
7 z = 1;
8 }
9 else{
10 z = -1;
11 }
12 }





























Figure 2.4.: Example of symbolic execution
2.2 Chiron Design
In this section, we first present the problem definition of protocol compliance
checking. Next we present the assumptions and scope of CHIRON. Finally, we give
an overview of CHIRON’s design and then provide the detailed description of each of
its components.
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2.2.1 Problem Definition and High Level Approach
The problem of checking compliance of protocol implementation is formally de-
fined as follows. Given an event-driven protocol implementation Ip written in C and
some desired property PROP that the protocol must comply to, is it the case that Ip
satisfies the property PROP? The property in question can express some desired func-
tionalities of the protocol or some guarantees the protocol should provide. We want
to emphasize that not all properties can be checked by our approach, and it mainly
relies on the granularity of the program analysis. This will be made clear in later
discussion.
At a high level, our approach has the following four steps:
• We first extract an FSM M , which abstractly captures the high-level opera-
tions of the protocol from Ip using a static program analysis technique. The
extracted FSM has similarity with Input-Output automata [70]. The network
events can be viewed as the FSM’s inputs whereas the actions performed by the
protocol can be viewed as FSM’s outputs. In our extracted FSM, each transi-
tion additionally has a condition over some program variables (i.e., conditional
variables).
• We then manually extract a desired property PROP from the protocol docu-
ments (e.g., RFCs, documentation) and express PROP as a pLTL formula ϕ.
• We then use a symbolic model checker to check whetherM satisfies the formula
ϕ, i.e., M |=? ϕ.
• If a counterexample (CEX) is generated due to the violation of ϕ by M , i.e.,
M 6|= ϕ, we further scrutinize the CEX to ensure that the CEX is realizable in



































Figure 2.5.: The architecture of CHIRON
2.2.2 Assumptions and Scope
We assume that the source code of the protocol is available for our analysis.
Extracting E-FSM from the implementation presents numerous challenges, the major
ones being the state explosion and the precision of the FSM extraction technique. We
focus specifically on network protocols written in C using an event-driven paradigm.
We make the assumption that the implementation has an explicit representation of the
protocol state machine, i.e., protocol states are explicitly realizable through program
variables. In addition, we assume that the possible values of the state variables are
drawn from a small, finite domain. We also assume that all the event-handling code
has a common entry point (often referred to as event dispatcher function) in the
source code.
Non-compliances of the given properties can occur in an implementation due to
logical programming errors such as wrong/missing state transitions and/or protocol
actions when responding to an event; ultimately, not following the high level protocol
design. We can only check properties which impose constraints over the events, state
variables, and conditional variables. Such properties can be manually extracted from
specifications such as RFCs, documents or bug reports.
We do not focus in detecting low-level memory errors (e.g., null dereferencing,
memory corruption, segmentation faults) in the implementation. There are comple-
mentary tools and techniques for detecting such errors [71–74].
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2.2.3 Design Overview
The architecture of CHIRON is presented in Fig. 2.5. It consists of the follow-
ing main components: FSM extractor, FSM translator, model checker, CEX parser,
spurious CEX checker, CEX replayer, and CEX visualizer.
The FSM extractor is the key component of CHIRON. Its main goal is to extract
the abstract FSM representation of the protocol using a static program analysis based
on symbolic execution [56]. To achieve this goal it takes as input the source code of
the protocol that is to be checked for compliance and two types of configurations:
(a) Configuration specific to the network stack, which the protocol relies on, and (b)
Configuration specific to the protocol implementation. The network stack configura-
tion contains information about the possible network events. Whereas the protocol
specific configuration consists of the program variables that comprise the FSM state
of the protocol, the event dispatcher function, the list of actions performed by the
protocol when responding to network events, and the set of conditional variables.
These conditional variables will be included in the FSM transitions, and they can be
referred to in the property being checked. We describe the FSM extraction algorithm
in Section 2.2.4 in details.
For compliance checking, CHIRON uses a symbolic model checker that takes as
input an FSM M represented in a high level modeling language and a pLTL formula
ϕ, which is a desired property the protocol must comply with and checks to see
whether the property ϕ is satisfied by M . In case ϕ is violated, the model checker
generates a counterexample (CEX) as evidence. The property that can be checked
depends on the granularity of the analysis, i.e., the variables that were included in
the FSM extraction. More precisely, if some information is not captured by the FSM
M due to a coarse-grained analysis, it cannot be used in the property.
To bridge the gap between the output format of the FSM extractor and the format
required by the different model checkers, we introduce an FSM translator. The FSM
translator takes as input the E-FSM represented in our XML-based intermediate
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language and translates it to the high level modeling language expected by the model
checker. Note that the conditions associated with the transitions of the E-FSM are
quantifier-free first order logic (QF-FOL) formulas over conditional program variables,
e.g., x > 0 ∧ (x+ y = 5) ∧ y < 0. However, model checkers generally do not support
QF-FOL formulas and expects the transition conditions to be boolean variables, i.e.,
propositions. The FSM translator maps each unique atom (e.g., x + y = 5) of the
transition conditions to a unique propositional variable.
Due to abstraction during FSM extraction and also due to abstracting atoms with
propositions, the counterexample (CEX) generated by the model checker may just be
a false CEX (i.e., not factual CEX). More precisely, the CEX generated by the model
checker may not be realizable during an actual execution of the protocol. Hence, to
rule out false CEXs, we use a two-step CEX verification process.
A CEX generated by the model checker contains the boolean (i.e., true/false)
assignment to each proposition. As the model checker is oblivious to the semantics
of the atom (e.g., x > 0) associated with each proposition, it will check all possible
boolean values of the propositions during verification. It could happen that one
such boolean assignment to the propositions in a CEX is not satisfiable considering
their corresponding concrete atoms. To rule out such cases, we use a Spurious CEX
checker that consults an SMT solver to check whether each transition condition in the
CEX is satisfiable according to the truth assignment given by the model checker. If all
transition conditions of a CEX are satisfiable, we refer to the CEX as a consistent CEX.
However, in case of an inconsistent CEX, i.e., at least one transition condition is not
satisfiable, the Spurious CEX checker automatically generates invariants that notify
the model checker to rule out the unsatisfiable transition in the future verification
steps.
Due to the abstractions used during the extraction of the E-FSM, a consistent
CEX still may not be realizable in an actual execution of the protocol, especially, while
checking liveness properties [75]. Hence, to rule out such false CEXs, we use a CEX
replayer that generates concrete program inputs from the consistent CEX with the
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help of the SMT solver, and concretely executes the protocol implementation using
those inputs. It also monitors the execution to check whether the state transitions
and the associated actions in the implementation and in the CEX agree. If a consistent
CEX is realizable during the replay, we call it a factual CEX.
Two auxiliary modules are used by CHIRON in the process of compliance check-
ing. The first is a parser (CEX parser) that converts the CEXs generated by the
model checker to the input of Spurious CEX Checker. Specifically, it takes as input
a proposition-atom map file generated by the FSM translator and the CEX gener-
ated by the model checker, then replaces the propositions with their respective atoms
in the CEX. For instance, if the map file contains the proposition-atom mapping
P 7→ {y < 5} and the CEX maps P to false, then the CEX parser replaces P 7→ false
with (y < 5) 7→ false. The second is a visualizer (CEX visualizer) that graphically
presents the factual CEX to the user so that the CEX can be easily understood.
2.2.4 FSM Extraction Algorithm
The FSM extraction algorithm takes protocol source code as input and two con-
figuration files– one related to the protocol implementation and the other related to
the network stack – and extracts the FSM of the protocol. The protocol configu-
ration file contains the following information: a list of program variables that form
the protocol FSM state, an entry point to the event handling code (i.e., event dis-
patcher function), the granularity of the analysis by selecting program variables (i.e.,
conditional variables) that should be marked as symbolic (e.g., the packet header or
the packet buffer), and the list of actions along with their signatures (e.g., send data
function with argument 255 means the action sending command byte). The network
stack configuration contains a list of events and how to trigger these events in the
code (e.g., possibly by setting a bit or by assigning a particular value to a variable).
At a high level, our algorithm has the structure of a graph search algorithm in
which we choose one of the possible events that can happen in the current state and
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symbolically execute the protocol code from the entry point of the event handling
function until it encounters new states or transitions. In that sense, it can also be
viewed as a fixed point iteration algorithm. Specifically, the algorithm follows the
structure of the breadth-first search algorithm (BFS). However, other graph search
algorithms (e.g., depth-first search, iterative deepening search, A∗) can be easily
adopted for our purpose. Although BFS is less memory efficient than DFS, we use
BFS as it can be easily parallelizable and it can find states in shorter time. We keep
track of the values of the protocol state variables and also the path conditions that
are encountered during symbolic analysis. Whenever the value of one of the protocol
state variables are changed, we check to see whether we have seen that state. If this
is the first time the state has occurred then we mark it as a new state, which will
be used for analysis later. We also check to see whether we have seen the transition
between the current state and new state. If the transition is new then we add it to
the FSM. We use the path conditions gathered during the symbolic execution as the
condition of the transition. We continue the analysis until we do not see any new
state or transition.
A pseudocode of our algorithm is presented below (c.f., Algorithm 1). The algo-
rithm starts off by constructing the initial execution state e0 of the program. The
initial state of the program contains initialized values for both protocol state variables
and other non-symbolic global variables. It then extracts the initial protocol state q0
from e0 using the function ExtractFsmState. This function basically takes a projection
of the protocol state variables and their values from a given program state. We then
mark q0 as seen and add it to the FSM M . We then add the execution state e0 to a
working queue We. Next we process one execution state ei at a time in FIFO manner
until We is empty. We first extract the associated FSM state qi from ei. Then we
try all possible events τ that are feasible in that state. For each such event τ , we
run symbolic analysis from the protocol event handling entry point by simulating the
occurrence of τ . The symbolic execution returns all possible paths and their associ-
ated execution states, path conditions, and associated actions taken by the protocol
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(e.g., sending an acknowledgement, retransmitting a packet). For each of the possible
paths, we take the execution state ej, the path condition on symbolic variables cj, and
the actions a performed by the protocol. We then extract the FSM state qj from ej.
We insert qj to the FSM M if we have not seen qj and mark it as seen. In that case,
we also add ej to We. We then check whether we have seen the transition qi
τ,c,a
−→ qj.
If not, we add it to M and mark it as seen.
Algorithm 1: FSM Extraction Algorithm
Input: The protocol source S, analysis configuration C, network-stack
configuration N
Output: An abstract FSM M of the protocol
1 Queue We ← ∅; FSM M ← ∅;
2 Create initial program state e0;
// q0 is the initial protocol FSM state
3 q0 ← ExtractFsmState(e0);
4 We.enqueue(e0);
5 M.Q← {q0};
// M.Q is the set of states
6 M.qI ← q0;
// M.qI is the initial state
7 M.R← ∅;
// M.R is the set of transitions
8 Mark state q0 as old;
9 while We 6= ∅ do
10 ei ← We.dequeue();
11 qi ← ExtractFsmState(ei);
12 foreach Event τ ∈ PossibleEvents do
13 Sq ← SymbolicExecution(S,C,N, ei, τ);
14 foreach 〈ej, c, a〉 ∈ Sq do
15 qj ← ExtractFsmState(ej);
16 if qj is not old then
17 We.enqueue(ej);
18 M.Q←M.Q ∪ {qj};
19 Mark state qj as old ;
20 if Transition 〈qi, τ, c, a, qj〉 is not old then
21 M.R←M.R ∪ {〈qi, τ, c, a, qj〉};
22 Mark transition 〈qi, τ, c, a, qj〉 as old ;
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2.2.5 FSM Translation, Property Extraction and Verification
Once an abstract FSM is received from the FSM extractor, the FSM translator
automatically carries out the following two functions: (i) It generates a mapping
between each unique atom in the path conditions with a unique proposition; (ii)
It then translates the abstract FSM description to the input modeling language of
the model checker. As the model checker generally works with propositions whereas
we have quantifier-free first-order logic formulas as the path conditions (e.g., (x >
0)∧(x+y = 5)∧y < 5), the FSM translator replaces each unique atom (e.g., (x > 0))
with a propositional variable. Function (ii) of FSM translator is dependent on the
input modeling language of the model checker. This function needs to be adapted to
handle different model checkers.
The properties against which to check the protocol implementation can come from
exploring RFC documents, research papers proposing the protocol, properties from
the developer, and possible bug reports. For specifying the properties in pLTL, the
E-FSM and the atom-proposition mapping file is required.
Once the FSM is translated to the high level modeling language, the model checker
takes that model and the property to check and exhaustively searches the state space
to look for an execution of the model in which the property is violated. Once such an
example is found, it is returned as a CEX. Each state in the CEX is a truth assignment
to each of the different propositions used in the E-FSM.
2.2.6 Spurious CEX Checking
Since the model checker we use is oblivious towards the real semantic meaning
of the propositions, we can have a CEX which is spurious. More precisely, the truth
assignment given by the model checker in the CEX might not be satisfiable.
For example, let us assume we have the following three proposition-atom mappings
from the FSM translator: p 7→ {x > 0}, q 7→ {x + y = 5}, r 7→ {y < 5}. Let
us also assume that there is a transition in the FSM whose condition is p ∧ q ∧ r
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and the counterexample assigns the propositions p, q, and r the following values:
false, true, true, respectively. Now, if y < 5 and x + y = 5, then it is apparent that
x > 0 cannot be false. Hence, ¬(x > 0) ∧ (x + y = 5) ∧ y < 5 is not satisfiable.
The purpose of the Spurious CEX checker is to rule out such cases by consulting
a SMT solver. When the CEX fails the spurious check, i.e., there is a transition
condition which is not satisfiable according to the truth assignment given by the
model checker, then the Spurious CEX checker forwards an appropriate invariant to
the model checker to rule out this case and continue verification. For instance, in our
example, the invariant will be (q ∧ r → p) (if q and r are true, then it implies that p
is true).
2.2.7 Replaying CEX
Due to abstractions (i.e., when we extract the E-FSM state from the program
state, we ignore some of the program variables), fixed number of loop iterations during
symbolic execution, and the granularity of the analysis process, we could have a CEX
which is not realizable during the real execution of the protocol even though the
CEX passes the spurious checking. This is specifically relevant while verifying liveness
properties.
For instance, let us assume that the user selects a coarse-grained analysis in which
the user does not take into consideration a specific timer. Now let us assume that
the property we want to verify is that: “Whenever the protocol is in state S1 then it
implies that the protocol will eventually move to state S2” (formally,((state = S1)→
(state = S2))). Let us assume that there is a self-loop in S1 that is conditioned by
a timeout of the timer, where the timer is not considered in the analysis. Hence, the
condition of the self-loop in the E-FSM does not include the timeout. The model
checker can easily find a counterexample in which the protocol always stays in state
S1 using the self-loop whereas in the real code, this will not happen as the timeout
will happen and the program will move to possibly a new state.
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To rule out cases like above, we replay the CEX and follow along the execution of
the program. The replay execution is guided by the CEX which instructs the replay
mechanism what branches to take via the truth assignment of the propositions. We
monitor the different actions and state changes during the execution and whether it
matches the CEX. If the protocol execution agrees with the CEX, then we report the
CEX by visualizing the factual CEX to the user.
2.3 Implementation
In this section, we present the details related to the implementation of CHIRON.
We also describe how we address the various implementation challenges and point out
some adopted optimizations to speed up the compliance checking process of CHIRON.
2.3.1 Preparation for Analysis
Before the protocol source becomes amenable to our framework we require some
steps to prepare the source. Recall that our framework only requires the source
files that implement the protocol analyzes it in isolation. To make the source self-
contained, we carry out the following steps in order. Among the following steps, only
the code harnessing step requires manual efforts.
Preprocessing done by compiler Since we want to analyze only the protocol
source code, not any underlying network stack code, we first preprocess the necessary
protocol source files by using a C preprocessor. We basically use gcc -E -P to stop
the compilation process right after preprocessing stage. After this step, we obtain a
preprocessed source file containing all the declarations from the included header files
and having all the macros expanded.
Slicing the source Like any other program analysis, our analysis could be ad-
versely affected by the size of the source. From the user-provided configuration file,
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we slice the protocol source using the state variables as the slicing criteria. This step
generates a smaller compilable source from the original source that only contains the
necessary program information required for the analysis. For slicing the source, we
use Frama-C (Fluorine version) [76]. We would like to emphasize that this step is not
mandatory but is useful to speed up the analysis.
Code harnessing In this step, we make the source completely self-contained by
wrapping it in a test harness if necessary. To do so, we first add a main() function
to the protocol source code, where we mark all the extern variables of the source
as symbolic (e.g., uip appdata, the network stack payload buffer in Contiki) and
then call the event dispatcher function (e.g., telnetd appcall()). An example of
a harnessed main() function for Telnetd protocol is shown in Fig. 2.6. In § 2.3.2,
we will explain the reason for calling the dispatcher function once in the main()
function. Next, we add empty stub functions for the external functions, for instance,
uip send() function of the TCP/IP stack for Contiki, which the application calls to
transmit a message over the network.
If necessary, we provide simple implementations of basic library functions such
as strlen(), memcpy(). In case a library function returns a value, for example,
is timer expired(), we provide a small stub implementation that returns a symbolic
value. Hence, our analysis can capture all the additional transitions created due to the
branching conditions on the returned symbolic value. In addition, we unroll any loop
code blocks for a fixed number of iterations. If required, we can even unroll a loop
block for a variable number of iterations by marking the loop counter as symbolic,
which results in a large number of extra, but futile, transitions due to the symbolic
loop counter.
Generating LLVM bitcode In the very last step of preparation, we use the
llvm-gcc (version 4.2 for LLVM 2.9) compiler front end to generate LLVM bitcode
of the protocol source. The output is used by the FSM extractor to carry out the




3 /* Network stack payload buffer */
4 mark_symbolic (uip_appdata);
5 /* Network stack payload length */
6 mark_symbolic (uip_len);
7 /* Network connection struct */
8 mark_symblic(uip_conn);
9 /* An opaque pointer used by the process */
10 mark_symblic(ts);




Figure 2.6.: A sample of a harnessed main function for the same Telnetd protocol
source shown in Fig. 2.2
2.3.2 Symbolic Execution for Deriving FSM
Once we have the protocol source (to be precise, LLVM bitcode) and the con-
figuration files, we extract the E-FSM out of the source using our FSM extractor.
We then use the KLEE symbolic execution engine [77] to symbolically execute the
LLVM bitcode (LLVM-2.9 version) of the given program. We have implemented and
integrated our FSM extractor in KLEE as a library containing more than 4 KLOC
of C++ code to the original KLEE code base.
The FSM extractor starts by loading the LLVM bitcode of the protocol imple-
mentation as an LLVM module. It then creates the initial program state (e0) and
extracts the corresponding initial FSM state (q0) from the LLVM module by reading
out the values of the protocol state variables. For each possible network event (τi),
the extractor injects the event into the appropriate program variable and initiates
symbolic execution of the implementation against the injected event. The execution
may fork depending on the branch conditions on any symbolically marked variables
(e.g., uip appdata) along with the execution path. Such conditions become the path-
constraint of the execution path the code took responding to the event τi. Once the
symbolic execution finishes, the FSM extractor analyzes each of the execution paths
to extract the corresponding FSM state (qj) by reading out the values of the state
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variables and to create the corresponding transition from q0 to qj based on the con-
straints of the execution path. Next, the extractor again runs the symbolic execution
for e0 but against the event τi+1 and so on. Once it finishes executions for e0, the
extractor repeats the same steps for the next program state ej in the queue. Along-
side, the extractor builds the E-FSM containing only distinct FSM states and FSM
transitions observed during each round of the symbolic executions.
Note that the harnessed main() function in Fig. 2.6 calls the event dispatcher
function once rather than calling the dispatcher function inside a infinite loop. We do
this to ensure the termination of the symbolic execution of the program. However, to
mimic the real execution that is calling the dispatcher function every time an event
occurs, the FSM extractor starts the symbolic execution of the protocol implementa-
tion from the main() function against each event. This may seem counterintuitive as
the extractor always starts the execution from the main() function. But, in reality,
the extractor records the current program state2 information (i.e., the current values
of all the non-symbolic global variables) before KLEE removes the current program
state and uses this information to overwrite the memory of the program state to be
used in the next round of the symbolic execution just before executing the main()
function as if the program were executing from where it was left off. Thus we ensure
the termination of symbolic execution, otherwise the symbolic execution would not
terminate if we had an infinite loop in the main() function.
Recall that for an event-driven network protocol implementation, the dispatcher
function is invoked each time a network event occurs. However, one execution of
the dispatcher function is completely independent of the other. Therefore the imple-
mentation often retains the effects caused by a network event by modifying only the
global, most likely the state variables. Similarly, the FSM extractor runs the symbolic
execution multiple times, which invokes the event dispatcher function once for each
event. To resemble the independent execution of the event dispatcher function, the
2The program state is different from the protocol state. A program state consists of the current
values of all the global variables, whereas a protocol state is signified by the state (possibly global)
variable(s).
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extractor does not carry over the path constraints from the previous round of sym-
bolic execution. However, by recording the program state information (as explained
above), the extractor retains the effects on the protocol caused by the event.
2.3.3 FSM Translation and Model Checker
The FSM extractor outputs the E-FSM in a generic XML format that needs to
be translated to the language specific to the model checker of the user’s choice. For
pLTL model checker, one could possibly choose (a) an explicit-state model checker
such as SPIN [13] or (b) symbolic model checker such as NuSMV [78]. We choose
NuSMV 2.5.4 as symbolic model checkers tend to support models with large state
space.
We implemented the FSM translator in C++ (2 KLOC), which performs the fol-
lowing four steps: (i) Parses the XML-based intermediate representation of the FSM;
(ii) Translates the constraints generated during symbolic execution, from the KQuery
language [79] to a human readable version; (iii) Generates the atom-proposition map-
ping and stores it in a file; (iv) Translates the FSM into the SMV modeling language
of NuSMV 2.5.4. Step (i), (iii), and (iv) are straightforward and hence we do not
discuss the details here. The reader might wonder why would one need the step (ii).
This is due to the fact that LLVM converts all the integers to bitvectors. KLEE
uses the STP SMT solver [80] with ARRAY and BITVECTOR theory as the under-
lying theories. Hence, even a simple constraint such as x + y + c ≤ 5 expressed in
bitvector representation can possibly be unreadable by a human. Recall that, these
constraints are referred to in the properties. It is thus reasonable to have a level of
comprehensibility to the end user who is carrying out the verification process. For
example, see Fig. 2.7 for a KQuery and its associated human-readable constraint in
our language. Although a more intuitive notation would have been desired, it is very
difficult to achieve it due to a whole different kind of possibility in the bitvector rep-
resentation. In the example in Fig. 2.7, uip len[0,(2B)] means the 2 byte value
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which is read from the 0th byte position of the variable uip len. In the example,
(4B)0x0 uip conn[18,(2B)] signifies that the 2 byte value read from the 18th byte
position of uip conn is zero-extended to obtain a 4 byte value.
array payload[1] : w32 -> w8 = symbolic
array uip_len[2] : w32 -> w8 = symbolic
array uip_conn[48] : w32 -> w8 = symbolic
(query
[(Ule N0:(ReadLSB w16 0 uip_len)
1)
(Eq false (Eq 0 N0))
(Eq 255 (Read w8 0 payload))
(Slt 0









{0 < {(4B)0x0 {uip_conn[18,(2B)]}}}
(b)
Figure 2.7.: Representation of a path constraint obtained from the Telnetd protocol
shown in Fig. 2.2: (a) in KQuery language and (b) in our human readable version
2.3.4 Property Extraction and Verification
One of the most demanding parts of this analysis is coming up with desired prop-
erties that capture the state machine inconsistencies the implementation should not
have. To obtain such properties, we explore the RFCs of the different protocols,
academic papers and Internet blog posts talking about the protocol, bug report filed
by the developers or third parties. One of the main problems we faced is that the
properties one can derive are generally described at a very high level of abstraction.
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We then need to specify them in the implementation level details that are captured
by the extracted FSM.
To write the property, one would require the atom-proposition mapping file and
the E-FSM. We want to acknowledge that writing properties in pLTL needs a signif-
icant amount of effort. However, one can use property patterns to write the desired
properties in pLTL [81]. The property pattern gives a mapping between different re-
quirements in natural language and their pLTL counterpart. There are also automatic
tools that convert restricted natural language properties into pLTL formulas [81].
Once the property has been specified in pLTL, we add it to the input file along with
the model specification given by the FSM translator and run the model checking. If
the property has been violated by the model and a CEX is found, we forward the CEX
to the spurious CEX checker for further scrutiny. If the CEX is found to be inconsistent,
the spurious checker forwards an invariant which is added to the specification for the
next iteration of verification.
2.3.5 Spurious CEX Checker
Once we have received the parsed CEX from the NuSMV model checker, we check
consistency of each state and the transition in the CEX. For this we use the atom-
proposition map file generated by the FSM translator. We automatically generate
an SMT query from the CEX and the map file. For instance, for any state s in the
CEX, we take each proposition and its truth assignment of the form pi 7→ TVi where
TVi ∈ {true, false}, replace pi with its associated atom ai and construct a quantifier
first order formula of form
∧
i
(ai = TVi). We then call the STP SMT solver [80] with
the query and ask for a satisfiable substitution for the free variables. If the query is
satisfiable, we pass the CEX to the replay mechanism. However, if the query is not






¬pj → false” to
NuSMV using the INVAR keyword. This tells NuSMV that the states which do not
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satisfy the invariant is an inconsistent state and should not be explored during state
exploration.
2.3.6 Replay CEX
The replay mechanism takes a consistent CEX and try to concretely execute the




(ai = TVi) in each state of the CEX using the STP SMT solver
to get concrete values for the symbolic values then feed it to the replay mechanism
of KLEE in an input file. Recall that, to verify a plausible CEX we also have to
monitor that the state transitions in the CEX matches up with the state change
in the code. This will require instrumenting the source to have assertions, which
checks to see whether the state transitions and their corresponding actions match up.
However, for a different CEX, we would have to heavily instrument the source code
again. To avoid instrumenting the code to add assertions, we simulate the execution
using KLEE’s symbolic execution engine with concrete values. More precisely, at
each step of the CEX, we solve the constraints of that step using STP SMT solver
to get concrete values of each symbolic variables and overwrite the memory of each
symbolic variable with their respective concrete value. This has the advantage that
we do not require instrumenting the code at all. Additionally, we do not have to
worry about timeout events. The program runs with concrete values and we monitor
the program execution state to check whether the state transitions and actions of the
implementation match up with the state transitions and actions in the CEX. If this
is the case, we assume the CEX is a plausible one. When there is a loop in the CEX,
we unroll the loop for a fixed number of iterations and execute it accordingly.
2.3.7 Optimizations
We now describe two optimizations that we introduce in our CHIRON implementation–
one for preemptively ruling out spurious transitions generated by the FSM extraction
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algorithm, and the other for speeding up the process of finding a consistent CEX
during verification.
Modeling Network Stack Events
Since our FSM extraction is focused on network protocol implementations, net-
work events play a critical role in extracting the E-FSM. An implementation of a
network protocol relies on the underlying network stack protocols. For instance, the
Telnet server protocol runs on top of TCP. The underlying network stack protocols
can impose restrictions on the feasible order of network events. For example, in case
of the Telnet server protocol, receiving a data packet from a client without an estab-
lished connection with the client is not feasible. As our FSM extraction algorithm
is oblivious to such restricted ordering of events, it will generate spurious transition
when a restricted ordering of events needs to be respected. Equipped with this in-
tuition, one can contemplate the following two approaches to ignore the spurious
transitions during compliance checking.
(a) During the FSM extraction We allow the user to provide a restricted event
model that regulates the order in which the network events can occur during an
actual protocol execution. Our FSM extractor can exploit this restricted event model
to generate the list possible events feasible in a particular FSM state of the E-FSM
(See line 12 of Algorithm 1).
(b) During the verification In this approach, the FSM extractor attempts all
possible events during the extraction of the E-FSM. However, we allow the user to
provide a pLTL formula Ψ that captures the feasible order of network events in which
they can occur in an actual execution. To verify the compliance of the implementation
against the property ϕ, CHIRON checks conformance against Ψ→ ϕ instead of ϕ.
Although both approaches rely on the user-provided input, which is based on
domain knowledge, there are some major differences. The first approach has the
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advantage that the E-FSM is closer to the S-FSM. Whereas the second approach
yields both a larger FSM M and a larger formula Ψ → ϕ against which M is model
checked. As the runtime complexity of model checking is dependent on both the
model size and the formula size, the second approach incurs a high overhead during
verification. Therefore, we select the first approach as it enables us to obtain a reduced
FSM and also speeds up the verification process.
Initial Invariants
When an inconsistent CEX is encountered by the Spurious CEX checker, it forwards
an invariant to the model checker to rule out the unsatisfiable transition for future
verification. Let us consider that we have the following atoms: payload[0, (1B)] = 255,
payload[0, (1B)] = 254, and payload[0, (1B)] = 253. The atoms signify that the first
byte of the payload buffer is 255, 254, and 253, respectively. Let us also assume that
they are respectively mapped to propositions p, q, and r. According to the semantics
of the propositions, the valid assignments are the ones where all of p, q, and r are
false or only one of them is true at a time. Since the model checker is oblivious to
the relationships between the atoms, it can require up to 4 steps (because 4 out 8
possible truth assignments are correct) before the Spurious CEX checker rules out all
the spurious cases. However, with the following set of initial invariants we can easily
rule out all the 4 unwanted truth assignments: p → ¬q ∧ ¬r, q → ¬p ∧ ¬r, and
r → ¬p ∧ ¬q.
With the increasing complexity of the implemented protocol, the number of propo-
sitions is likely to increase, which can consequently require exponential number of
steps to find a consistent CEX.
2.4 Evaluation
In this section we assess the effectiveness and practicality of CHIRON. Specifically,
we intend to answer the following research questions: (a) Is CHIRON applicable to
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Table 2.1.: List of implementations evaluated using CHIRON
Protocol Type Implementation Protocol Notation
Contiki 2.4 Telnet C24
Telnet Server Contiki 2.7 Telnet C27
FNET 2.7.2 Telnet F
Contiki 2.7 DHCP C
DHCP Client
FNET 2.7.2 DHCP F
real protocol implementations in the wild? (b) Is CHIRON effective in finding non-
compliances? (c) How much improvement can we gain by applying the proposed
optimizations? (d) Is it possible to run compliance checking by CHIRON in a rea-
sonable amount of time?
2.4.1 Setup
We first demonstrate the efficacy of CHIRON by using it to evaluate various imple-
mentations of 2 protocols: Telnet and DHCP. Telnet is a byte-oriented bidirectional
communication protocol and often used as a mean to provide a command line interface
for interacting with a (possibly remote) device. Despite being an old protocol, Telnet
is still being used in the wild, for instance, by Android and other embedded systems’
developers, and also by Cisco network administrators. DHCP is a binary protocol
that assigns IP addresses to devices on a network. Because it greatly simplifies the
network administration, it is widely used in both home and enterprise settings.
We have obtained a total of 5 implementations of these protocols from different
TCP/IP network stacks: uIP (part of the Contiki OS) and FNET. In particular, we
focus on the Telnet server and DHCP client implementations from the source trees
of Contiki 2.4, Contiki 2.7, and FNET 2.7.2. We use Contiki 2.7 and FNET 2.7.2
because these were the latest releases at the time of evaluation. Contiki 2.4 came
to our attention because of the bug reported on its Telnetd implementation [12]. A
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summary of the evaluated implementations can be found in Table 2.1. For brevity,
we will use the notation defined in Table 2.1 to identify each of the implementations
in the rest of our discussion.
We have configured both the Contiki and the FNET based on their default config-
uration to enable TCP/IP support for IPv4, Telnet server, and DHCP client service.
By default, the Telnet server for Contiki supports only one active client session.
Therefore, to be consistent, we have configured the Telnet server for FNET to also
handle at most 1 active session.
We run our experiments on a commodity machine equipped with an Intel Core i7-
2620M CPU and 8GB of RAM, running Ubuntu 14.04 LTS with Linux kernel version
3.13.
2.4.2 Property Verification
We have obtained 11 representative properties for the Telnet server protocol and
7 for the DHCP client protocol to demonstrate the effectiveness of CHIRON. The list
of properties as well as the verification results are shown in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3.
The properties (DP1 – DP7) for a DHCP client (see Table 2.3) are all extracted
from the RFC [82]. They govern how a DHCP client implementation must react to
various network events. However, for the Telnet server, we select the properties from
various sources (see Table 2.2). The TP1 property is specific to implementations that
support only one active client session at a time. TP2 – TP4 are obtained from the
Telnet RFC [83]. They describe how an implementation must interpret incoming data
and react accordingly. Properties like TP5 – TP7, not originated from specifications,
are used to demonstrate how a developer can use CHIRON to reason whether the
implementation transit correctly between states as desired. One important aspect of
the Telnet protocol is the Network Virtual Terminal (NVT), which is an abstraction
the Telnet protocol uses to overcome platform compatibility issues by starting with all
options disabled. Many modest Telnet servers implemented for resource-constrained
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The server must not accept




If receive WILL after IAC,
must send DO or DONT
✓ ✓ ✓
TP3
If receive DO after IAC,




If receive IAC IAC, must




If receive IAC in NORMAL
state, must go to IAC state




If receive DO after IAC,
must go to DO state
✓ ✓ ✓
TP7
If receive WILL after IAC,
must go to WILL state
✓ ✓ ✓
TP8
For NVT, if receive DONT




For NVT, if receive WONT








For NVT, never send
WONT request
✓ ✓ ✓
Total: 6 0 5 7 0 4 11 0 0
embedded systems, including the three we have evaluated, tend to remain as NVTs
and not to provide support for any sophisticated options. Therefore, we have derived
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If receive DHCPNAK in REQUESTING




If receive DHCPOFFER in SELECTING
state, must immediately send out




If receive no DHCPOFFER in
SELECTING state and response timer
expired, must resend DHCPDISCOVER
✓ ✓
DP4
If receive DHCPOFFER in
REQUESTING state, must discard, not
change state, take no actions
✓ ✓
DP5
If receive DHCPACK in REQUESTING




If receive no DHCPACK in




If receive no DHCPACK in
REQUESTING state and state timer
expired, start over DHCP negotiation
✓ ✓
Total: 6 0 1 7 0 0
four additional properties (TP8 – TP11) from the Telnet RFC specifically targeting
the implementations that intend to remain as NVTs. Failing to comply with such
properties could lead to endless acknowledgment loops as pointed out in the Telnet
RFC.
We have discovered a total of 10 non-compliance instances: 5 in Telnet C24, 4 in
Telnet C27, and 1 in DHCP C. We now describe the non-compliances discovered by
CHIRON in details; however, we group the similar non-compliance instances together.
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Non-compliance 1 (Accepting multiple client connections simultaneously)
According to the Telnet server implementation for Contiki, the server is expected to
have only one active session at a time. In other words, the server must not accept
any new connection from a Telnet client during an on-going session, which we denote
as the property (TP1). In our experiment, CHIRON generates a factual CEX for
Telnet C24 demonstrating that the Telnet server accepts a new connection from a
client even if there is an on-going session. In fact, this is due to a state machine bug
that can manifest upon receiving any additional connection. This bug was, however,
already reported [12] and fixed in the later release of Contiki-2.5.
After a close inspection, we have identified that this state machine bug can be
damaging as it has several implications: (a) inconsistent protocol behaviors as it
causes the protocol to end up in an unexpected (correct, but not in this context) FSM
state by taking an undesirable FSM transition and may change the program variables,
possibly by re-initialization, and (b) security issues as it can affect confidentiality and
integrity by sending the data intended for one connection to the other connection.
Such a state machine bug can often remain undetected during the concrete execution
of the implementation because of its nuances. Moreover, it also depends on the
developer’s ability to imagine such a scenario to manifest the bug using traditional
testing approaches (e.g., black-box testing), whereas we have discovered this non-
compliance using CHIRON with a very little effort.
Non-compliance 2 (Failed to reply appropriate Telnet command) Both
the Telnetd implementations from Contiki (Telnet C24 and Telnet C27) violate the
two properties (TP2 and TP3) that require the Telnet server must reply back the
appropriate Telnet command if it receives WILL (in case of TP2) or DO (in case
of TP3) from the connected Telnet client. The factual CEX generated by CHIRON
demonstrates that there exists an execution path in the real implementation where
the Telnet server fails to send back its response to the received Telnet command if
the buffer (i.e., telnetd buf) is full. For both the implementations, the Telnet server
41
uses this buffer to temporarily store all outgoing data including the Telnet command
responses and sends the data over the network from time to time.
A careful inspection of the source reveals that the Telnet server (to be precise,
sendopt function) does not check if it has failed to append the Telnet command
response to the buffer. Moreover, the Telnet command response is stored in an array
local to sendopt, which is lost right after the function returns. Therefore if the buffer
is full, the Telnet server would not ever notice that the response to the received Telnet
command has not been sent, which causes an interoperability issue since the Telnet
client keeps on waiting for the reply from the server. Such a non-compliance attests
to the effectiveness of CHIRON in finding subtle interoperability bugs.
Non-compliance 3 (Potential endless acknowledgment loops) Like the pre-
vious non-compliance, both the Telnetd implementation from Contiki (Telnet C24
and Telnet C27) violate the two properties TP10 and TP11. According to the Tel-
net RFC [83], the protocol must acknowledge a DONT (resp., WONT) command by
sending out a WONT (resp., DONT) only if the received DONT (resp., WONT) com-
mand causes a change in the current mode; otherwise, it must not acknowledge. This
is necessary to prevent potential endless acknowledgment loops– each party considers
the incoming commands as new commands rather than the acknowledgments. Since
both Telnet C24 and Telnet C27 are the basic implementation of the Telnet protocol
(i.e., as an NVT), a request to disable any option cannot make any change in the
mode of the terminal, and therefore they must not acknowledge any DONT/WONT
command requests. For both the implementations, CHIRON generates the corre-
sponding factual CEX, which demonstrates the Telnet server actually replies back
WONT (resp., DONT) when it receives a DONT (resp., WONT) command request
from the client.
One can argue that a Telnet client never sends a DONT/WONT command when
connected to an NVT Telnet server (like Telnet C24 and Telnet C27) since the client
would not be successful to enable any option in the first place. However, there can
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be two possible scenarios where such endless acknowledgment loops are feasible: (a)
The first case happens when the Telnet client allows multiple new requests about
an option that is currently under negotiation, and this is not explicitly prohibited in
the Telnet RFC [84]; (b) Second case happens if the Contiki Telnet server connects
with a (possibly faulty) Telnet client that initiates a DONT/WONT request and
also acknowledges the received DONT and WONT commands. Consequently, such
loops can impair the performance of the IoT devices running either Telnet C24 or
Telnet C27 implementation. This non-compliance exhibits how CHIRON can be used
to check if an implementation complies with its RFC specifications.
Non-compliance 4 (Failed to immediately start over DHCP configuration)
According to the RFC [82] of the DHCP protocol, a DHCP client receiving a DHCP-
NAK message from the DHCP server as a response to its previously sent DHCPRE-
QUEST message must restart the DHCP configuration process by sending a new
DHCPDISCOVER message, which we denote as the property DP1. In our analy-
sis of the DHCP client implementation for Contiki (DHCP C), CHIRON generates
a factual CEX demonstrating an execution path of the implementation that violates
the property DP1.
A close inspection of the source reveals that DHCP C does not handle the re-
ception of a DHCPNAK message; instead, DHCP C keeps on re-transmitting its
DHCPREQUEST upon timeout for multiple times before giving up and restarting
the configuration process. Such a reaction of DHCP C to DHCPNAK messages,
however, does not lead to any inconsistency in the protocol state/behavior. Nev-
ertheless, this implementation hinders the performance of the DHCP protocol as it
waits for a long time before starting over the configuration process. Uncovering such
a non-compliance shows that CHIRON can help developers find some bugs capable
of impairing the protocol performance.
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Table 2.4.: Impact of various event models on FSM extraction. EM1 corresponds to
the restricted model described in section 2.3.7, whereas EM2 considers all possible
events with no specific order.
Protocol
Notation
Event Model 1 (EM1) Event Model 2 (EM2)
States Transitions Propositions States Transitions Propositions
Telnet C24 6 84 19 6 114 19
Telnet C27 12 162 21 12 306 21
Telnet F 7 18 11 7 34 11
DHCP C 4 46 17 4 47 17
DHCP F 8 80 45 8 140 45
2.4.3 Impact of Network Event Models on FSM Extraction
Table 2.4 shows the comparison between the extracted FSMs (i.e., E-FSMs) using
two different event models. Event Model 1 (EM1) corresponds to the user-provided
restricted event model that regulates the order of the network events in which they
can occur in an actual execution of the protocol. Whereas Event Model 2 (EM2)
represents the less restrictive event model where any event can occur from the set of
all possible network events. For both the event models, the E-FSMs contain the same
number of FSM states. However, in case of EM2, the E-FSM has more transitions
as expected. Most of these transitions are spurious since in reality such transitions
can never occur. This result empirically supports our claim about the advantage of
having a restricted event model as pointed out in section 2.3.7. Note that the number
of propositions stays in the same in both the cases.
2.4.4 Execution Time of CHIRON
To evaluate the feasibility of CHIRON being a practical compliance checking
framework, we report the execution time incurred by the major components of CH-
IRON as shown in Table 2.5. In this set of experiments, we have considered both
optimizations: EM1 (the restricted event model) during FSM extraction and the ini-
tial invariants during verification. Each reported execution time is an average of ten
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Table 2.5.: Run Time of CHIRON components (unit: seconds). For each protocol
implementation, the value for Property Verification is the aggregate time for ver-












Telnet C24 0.98 8.38 1.05 10.41
Telnet C27 6.29 14.95 1.12 22.37
Telnet F 0.16 1.64 – 1.80
DHCP C 7.01 1.45 0.24 8.70
DHCP F 15.09 3043.80 – 3058.89
independent runs. Note that, once the E-FSM is extracted, we can then use it for
checking compliance of an arbitrary number of properties. For property verification,
we report the total required time to check all the 11 properties for Telnetd and 7
properties for DHCP client. CEX replay is only applicable if CHIRON has found a
consistent CEX.
Among the three Telnetd implementations, CHIRON requires the longest time to
extract the E-FSM of Telnet C27, which has a relatively larger E-FSM size (see Ta-
ble 2.4). The same trend is observed in case of the two DHCP client implementations.
Note that both the DHCP client implementations take longer time than the Telnetd
implementations. This is due to the fact that, for each receive event, a DHCP client
implementation handles a symbolic packet of size at most 552 bytes as opposed to a
Telnetd implementation that handles 1 byte at a time.
CHIRON spends the majority of its execution time in verifying properties. The
required time spent in the verification phase is influenced by the E-FSM size, the
length of the properties, and the number of propositions. However, the verification
time for DHCP C is much smaller than its FSM extraction time, and this is because
of having a relatively smaller E-FSM with a small number of propositions compared
to other implementations. On the contrary, DHCP F incurs a roughly 50-minute
verification time because it has 1.7 times as many transitions and more than 2.5 times
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as many propositions as its Contiki counterpart, DHCP C. The high verification time
is due to the increased number of propositions, which actually causes an exponential
growth of the state-space of the model checker.
We also demonstrate the usefulness of adding initial invariants to speed up the
convergence of finding a consistent CEX. For the purpose of comparison, we repeat the
verification phase against the aforementioned properties. Without adding the initial
invariants, the time required to finish the verification step for Telnet F elevates to
333.4 seconds. Whereas none of the other implementations finished the verification
for even one property within a time limit of 60 minutes. We also observe the benefit of
the Spurious CEX checker during the verification of Telnet F against the 11 properties
as it was able to filter out a total of 1341 CEXs at an earlier stage.
2.5 Discussion
In this section, we briefly discuss how CHIRON can possibly be extended and also
discuss threats to validity of our evaluation.
What if FSM states are not realizable explicitly through program variables
Our FSM extraction technique requires the protocol FSM state to be explicitly real-
izable through program variables. However, one can implement a protocol S-FSM
either by representing the states as goto labels in the program or by not even having
any FSM representations at all. Even though it is possible to lift our analysis to
handle state machines implemented using goto labels, how to capture implicit state
information remains an open research question.
Which program variables to mark as symbolic In our analysis, only the con-
straints over symbolic variables are added to the transition of the E-FSM. Hence,
if one desires to reason about certain variables in the program during analysis, then
it is crucial that those variables are marked as symbolic. Now one obvious question
the readers might ask is that in a network protocol implementation what variables
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should be added as symbolic. One rule of thumb for network protocols is that any
external or environmental variables (e.g., packet buffer) which can influence the state
transition of the protocol should be marked as symbolic.
Accuracy of compliance checking Since the E-FSM is an approximation of the
FSM that is implemented in the source, CHIRON may provide incorrect verdicts on
compliance checking of the protocol implementation. We have a two-step process
for ruling out false non-compliance verdicts, nevertheless, it would require further
refinement of the abstraction during FSM extraction to rule out false compliance
verdicts. However, we want to emphasize that during our evaluation all compliance
and non-compliance verdicts have been manually verified for further assurance.
Predicate abstraction To guarantee the termination of our analysis, we require
that each program variable that explicitly constitutes the protocol state takes value
from a small, finite domain. Obviously, this is restrictive and might not be satisfied
by some stateful, event-driven protocol implementations. One possibility is to intro-
duce predicates over the state variables that can take values from a large domain.
Such abstractions (i.e., predicate abstractions) will combine multiple concrete-valued
variables into a single abstract state where the predicates’ values are either true or
false. Even though we will lose precision due to abstraction, it will enable us to handle
large, possibly infinite, states of the protocol.
Alternative execution semantics CHIRON FSM extraction technique only con-
siders non-concurrent, asynchronous C programs. For handling programs with al-
ternative execution semantics, for instance, event-driven concurrent programs for
TinyOS [85] or multi-threaded C programs will require revamping the symbolic exe-
cution engine [60, 86].
Threats to validity There are a couple of threats to validity in our evaluation. (1)
KLEE has a high degree of non-determinism which may cause the different execution
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times reported here to be not reproducible. (2) We used KLEE and STP SMT solver
with their default configuration, and our reported results on execution time may not
be the same for other configurations.
2.6 Summary
In this work, we have developed a framework CHIRON for checking whether an
event-driven protocol implementation in C complies with some desired properties
written as pLTL formulas. For checking compliance, we first extract the approximate
FSM of the protocol (i.e., E-FSM) automatically from the implementation with
minimal developer input. Once we have extracted the E-FSM from the protocol
source, we use a symbolic model checker to check the satisfaction of each of the desired
pLTL properties against the E-FSM. When the property in question is violated,
a counterexample (CEX) is generated by the model checker as evidence. We then
use a two-step validation process to rule out the false CEXs. We have implemented
CHIRON on top of KLEE and empirically showed the efficacy of it by uncovering
several non-compliances of 5 protocol implementations from different network stacks.
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3 ADVERSARIAL TESTING OF NETWORK PROTOCOL
IMPLEMENTATIONS
Mobile ad-hoc networks allow a set of wireless nodes to communicate with each other
without any central infrastructure. As traditional routing protocols do not perform
well in a constrained environment such as wireless networks, significant work has been
put into designing routing protocols for wireless networks. Examples include proactive
protocols such as DSDV [22], and OLSR [23], reactive protocols such as AODV [24]
and DSR [25], and hybrid protocols such as DST [88]. Additionally, there have also
been efforts to improve the performance of the routing protocols by operating at
the data link layer instead of the network layer, a representative example being the
BATMAN [89] protocol. Given the increased threats that exist in wireless networks,
several secure routing protocols have been designed. Examples include SAODV [90],
ODSBR [91], ARAN [26], and Ariadne [92]. Many of the protocols mentioned above,
such as AODV, ARAN, OLSR, DSDV, and BATMAN, were implemented and are
available from public repositories [93–97].
Given the importance of routing as a fundamental component of wireless networks,
many protocols have been subjected to model checking the design [27] and to testing
the simulator-based implementation [28, 29]. For example, several model checking
tools [27,98,99] were used to verify wireless routing protocols, and several simulators
[28, 29] were used to demonstrate and test wireless routing protocols [22–25,88, 100].
While model checking helps to verify the validity of the design, it does not provide
a guarantee that the real-world implementation is free of bugs and vulnerabilities,
since implementations contain optimizations not captured by the model, sometimes
diverge from the design, and often introduce new bugs. In addition, while simulators
Some of the contents of this chapter is based on the joint work with Hyojeong Lee, Rahul Potharaju,
Charles Killian, and Cristina Nita-Rotaru [87]
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provide easier and simpler ways to describe a protocol, they sacrifice some aspects of



















Figure 3.1.: Comparison of the routing protocols based on popularity (computed by
searching on Google Scholar). Protocol counts indicate the total number of cita-
tions to the original research paper; Implementation counts indicate citations to the
implementations and the URL of the software.
Fig. 3.1 shows the popularity of some wireless protocols in the academic com-
munity (obtained from Google Scholar) — it is evident that hundreds of researchers
use the publicly available implementations for performance comparison across proto-
cols [33–35], or to investigate properties of the network stack such as performance of
TCP in multihop ad hoc networks [33,36]. Thus, it is important to ensure that these
implementations are robust and do not include faults and security vulnerabilities that
may lead them to enter an unsafe state or exhibit degraded performance.
Some recent works like Gatling [30] showed the importance of performing ad-
versarial testing for message-passing distributed systems. By testing systems im-
plementations beyond just basic functionality (i.e. examining edge cases, boundary
conditions, and ultimately conducting destructive testing), Gatling discovered vul-
nerabilities, many of which were not captured by model checking the design or by
simulator-based testing. However, Gatling requires the target protocol to be imple-
mented in the MACE language [101]. On the other hand, Max [31] focuses on two-
party network protocols to find attacks that can manipulate the victim’s execution
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control flow by relying on the user specified information about a known vulnerability
of the implementation to limit the search space and thereby catering itself as more
suitable for corner cases.
In this work, we focus on adversarial testing of implementations of wireless routing
protocols. We consider attacks and failures that are created through manipulation
of protocol messages and are specific to wireless routing protocols, having a global
impact on the protocol performance. We leverage the design of Turret [102]—an auto-
mated adversarial testing platform for distributed systems—to create an adversarial
testing platform for wireless routing protocols. Turret uses a network emulator to
create reproducible network conditions and virtualization to run unmodified binaries
of systems’ implementations. The platform requires the user to provide a description
of the protocol messages and corresponding performance metrics. Turret’s design is a
good starting point for a cost-effective wireless testing environment because it allows
a binary to run in its native operating system while limiting the impact of noise and
interference on the performance of the system. Our contributions in this work are:
• We present Turret-W, a platform for adversarial testing of wireless routing pro-
tocols. Turret-W leverages the design of Turret and includes new functionalities
such as the ability to differentiate routing messages from data messages, support
for protocols that use homogeneous or heterogenous packet formats, support for
protocols that run on geographic forwarding (not only IP), support for proto-
cols that operate at the data link layer instead of the network layer, support for
replay attacks, and ability to establish side-channels between malicious nodes.
As a result, Turret-W can test not only general attacks against routing, but also
wireless specific attacks such as blackhole and wormhole attacks. Our approach
is cost effective in comparison with the hardware and manpower costs required
by the approach in [35]. In addition, our approach does not pose any restric-
tion on the implementation language like Gatling [30], nor relies on a priori
knowledge of any vulnerability like Max [31].
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• We demonstrate attack discovery with Turret-W using detailed case studies
on five representative wireless routing protocols: a reactive protocol (AODV), a
secure reactive protocol (ARAN), and three proactive protocols (OLSR, DSDV,
and BATMAN), whose implementations we obtained from public repositories.
We found 1 new and 7 known attacks in AODV, 6 known attacks in ARAN, 5
known attacks in OLSR, 4 new and 7 known attacks in DSDV, and 7 known
attacks in BATMAN, for a total of 37 attacks. While most of attacks we found
are protocol level attacks, one attack in AODV and 4 attacks in DSDV were
solely implementation level attacks, and such attacks could have been discovered
only by testing the actual implementations under adversarial environments.
• We show that Turret-W also can find bugs, as it provides a testing environment
that is realistic and controllable. Unlike attacks, bugs cause performance degra-
dation in benign executions. We discovered 3 bugs in total, 2 in AODV and 1
in ARAN. The bugs in AODV were due to a subtle interplay between AODV
code and the operating system kernel.
3.1 Platform Overview
Our goal is to test wireless routing implementations, where the network conditions
can be reproducible and also isolated from outside world interference. In our previous
work [102] we created Turret, a platform for adversarial testing of message passing
distributed systems. The design of Turret makes it an appealing choice for testing
wireless network protocols because the emulation of the network ensures reproducible
performance and limits the noise and interference, while the virtualized approach al-
lows binaries to run in their native environments. However, Turret cannot be directly
applied to wireless networks or routing protocols. Below, we first give an overview
of Turret, the platform that we built on, and then explain what functionalities we
added to support wireless routing protocols. We refer to Turret with our extension
as Turret-W.
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Table 3.1.: Message delivery actions supported by Turret
Action Action Description Parameter
Drop Drops a message Drop probability
Delaying Injects a delay before it sends a
message
Delay amount
Duplicating Sends the same message several




Diverting Sends the message to a random
node instead of its intended des-
tination
None
3.1.1 Overview of Turret
Turret is a platform for performance-related attack discovery in unmodified dis-
tributed system binaries. Turret uses virtualization (i.e. KVM [103]) to run arbitrary
operating systems and applications, and network emulation (i.e. NS-3 [104]) to con-
nect these virtualized hosts in a realistic network setting. Turret requires a description
of the message formats that the system relies on, and a set of metrics that capture
the performance of the system.
A controller bootstraps the system by starting NS-3 and running application bi-
naries inside the virtual machines. Each of these virtual machines (VMs) acts as an
individual node of the distributed system. The VMs communicate with each other
with the help of the NS-3 emulator. Specifically, each VM is mapped to a node inside
NS3, called a shadow node, through a Tap Bridge connection (available in NS-3),
which connects the inputs and outputs of an NS-3 network device to the inputs and
outputs of the VM’s network interface (i.e., the corresponding TAP device of the VM)
as if the NS-3 network device is a local device to the VM. The controller lets each
shadow node know if it will act as a benign node or as a malicious node. A shadow
node instructed to act as malicious will activate the malicious proxy, a component
implemented by Turret on top of the Tap Bridge, to intercept messages generated
by the application running inside the virtual machine and modify them according to
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Table 3.2.: Message lying actions supported by Turret
Action Action Description Parameter
LieValue Changes the value of the field
with a specified value
The new value




LieSub Subtracts some amount from the
value of the field
The amount to
subtract
LieMult Multiplies some amount to the
value of the field
The amount to
multiply
LieRandom Modifies the value with a random
value in the valid range of the
type of the field
None
an attack strategy. An attack strategy may consist of two types of malicious actions:
Message Delivery Actions that affect when and where a message is delivered (see
Table 3.1) and Message Lying Actions that affect the contents of a message (see Ta-
ble 3.2). In the case of message lying actions, different fields inside a message can be
automatically modified based on the selected attack strategy and the user-provided
message formats.
3.1.2 Limitations of Turret for Wireless Routing
Turret cannot be directly applied to wireless networks or routing protocols because
of several limitations.
Distinguishing between control plane and data plane: While Turret can inject
attacks and faults into any message-oriented protocol, it does not differentiate data
messages from routing messages. In case of routing, many attacks on the data plane
including degradation in the application performance can be amplified if the routing
mechanism is disrupted. Thus, a platform intended for routing needs to control
independently both the control (routing) plane and the data plane so that it can
inject fine-grained attacks based on the type of the control plane messages and coarse-
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grained attacks based on the service type of the data plane messages. For wireless
networks, the separation is also needed to support basic attacks such as blackhole in
which an attacker will drop all data messages but participate in the routing algorithm
correctly.
Parsing homogeneous and heterogeneous packets: Turret expects an inter-
cepted packet to contain only one message pertaining to the target protocol. Whereas
routing protocols are typically designed to follow either homogeneous packet format
(i.e. the routing protocol packs one type of routing message(s) into a single data-
gram) or heterogeneous packet format (i.e. the routing protocol packs different types
of routing messages into a single datagram). In both cases, the length of the packet
can be fixed or variable. Routing protocols designed for wireless networks generally
adopt either packet formats, as communication is expensive in wireless networks.
Supporting non-IP packets: Turret assumes that the target protocol runs on top
of Internet Protocol (IP) at the network layer. Thus, the malicious proxy processes
each intercepted packet as an IP packet. However, not all existing wireless routing
protocols use IP as the packet forwarding protocol at the network layer. For example,
some protocols use geographic forwarding [105,106] where packets are forwarded based
on physical proximity. Others such as BATMAN [89] or HWMP [107] operate at
layer 2 (data link layer), instead of layer 3 (network layer), use MAC addresses for
routing instead of IP addresses and transport routing information encapsulated into
raw Ethernet frames. Therefore, it is important to support both non-IP and layer 2
routing packets to enable adversarial testing of such protocols.
Replaying packets: Turret does not provide the functionality to replay packets.
Replaying packets is particularly interesting in case of wireless networks since it is
a very low cost attack that can easily be launched. Note that packet replaying is
different from packet duplication. In a replay attack, an attacker records another
node’s valid packets and resends them (without modification) later to other benign
nodes via legitimate channels only if the packets contain the target control message(s).
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This causes other nodes to add incorrect routes to their routing table. Such attacks
can be used to impersonate a specific node or simply to disrupt the routing plane.
Establishing wormhole tunnels: Turret does not support colluding attacks. How-
ever, an attack specific to wireless networks that requires coordination between two
attackers and is shown to be very detrimental is the wormhole attack where two
colluding adversaries cooperate by tunneling packets between each other to create
a shortcut in the network. As wormhole attacks are feasible (basic attack requires
only two colluding nodes), it is important to be able to test the impact of wormhole
attacks on the routing protocol.
3.1.3 Turret-W Description
We modified Turret to address the above limitations. The new platform, Turret-
W, is shown in Fig. 3.2. The controller component coordinates the testing. It gen-
erates a topology file for the network emulator using a configuration file provided by
the user. The configuration file specifies parameters such as the network topology,
number of nodes, and number of malicious nodes. The controller then starts the vir-
tual machines and binds each of them to the underlying network emulation layer. It
then loads the routing service at the routing layer and instantiates the application at
the application layer. It accepts the list of attack strategies created by the strategy
generator and injects them into the malicious proxy. Finally, it collects log messages
used to estimate the performance of the application running on top of the routing
protocol.
Wireless network emulation: Like in Turret, the virtual machines operate on top
of a network emulation layer provided by NS-31. We configure NS-3 to emulate WiFi
links. We leverage the Tap Bridge connection (available in NS-3) to connect a VM
with its corresponding shadow node so that it enables a NS-3 net device to appear as
1Note that Emulab [108], MobiNet [109], Orbit [110] could also conceptually replace NS3. Emulab
with fixed wireless provides more realism. However, the approach provides less reproducible results
because of unwanted interference on the wireless channel and requires a separate implementation of








































Figure 3.2.: Turret-W platform (RP denotes Routing Protocol, RT denotes Routing
Table and VNIC denotes Virtual Network Interface Card)
a local device inside the VM thereby allowing the VM to use this local net device for
WiFi transmission. The network emulation layer creates a virtual multi-hop wireless
environment to transmit packets from a source to a destination virtual machine.
Attacks specific to wireless routing: We modified the Turret’s malicious proxy
(implemented on top of the Tap Bridge) to differentiate between messages originating
from the routing layer and the application layer based on the port number. Differenti-
ating data messages from routing messages allows Turret-W to implement a blackhole
attack wherein a malicious node acts benign at the routing layer but selectively/en-
tirely drops messages originating from the application layer.
We also provide support for a wormhole attack as follows: a wormhole tunnel is
implemented as part of the malicious proxy inside NS-3 connecting any two colluding
adversaries (precisely, shadow nodes). However, the routing code running in the
virtual machines are oblivious of this tunnel, which introduces a new challenge to deal
with. If we just forward data messages between the end nodes forming the wormhole,
one side effect is that the routing will believe there is no direct link between the two
end points of the wormhole. Therefore, to convince the routing services of the end
nodes, forming the wormhole tunnel, that they are direct neighbors of each other, we
allow these end nodes to exchange their own beacon messages (e.g., HELLO) over the
wormhole tunnel. At the same time, the beacon messages forwarded between the ends
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of the wormhole should be restricted only to those generated by the end nodes that
form the wormhole and not their neighbors since that will results in incorrect updates
of routing tables. All other routing protocol messages are forwarded by the colluding
nodes over the wormhole tunnel so that they can perform the wormhole attack in
the route discovery process. As a result, Turret-W supports all the malicious actions
presented in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.
Homogeneous and heterogenous packets: To inject a malicious action, the ma-
licious proxy needs to be able to parse messages in order to act on different message
types and to lie on a particular field of a message. The message-parser reads a message
format description and outputs necessary source code that feeds into the malicious
proxy. This source code contains a set of API calls (e.g., getMessageType(), getMes-
sageSize() etc.) that expose properties of the message to the malicious proxy. An
example message format description (a route request for AODV) is given below:
AodvRreq {







Routing protocols can follow either homogeneous packet format or heterogeneous
packet format. For instance, AODV sends a route request message in a single UDP
packet and thus, can be said to follow the homogeneous packet format. In contrast,
OLSR allows individual messages be piggybacked and transmitted together in one
transmission such as a topology control message and a HELLO message can be sent
together in a single UDP packet. We modified the message-parser generator so that
it can handle both homogeneous and heterogeneous packet formats and thus, enable
testing of a wider variety of routing protocols.
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Table 3.3.: Malicious actions added by Turret-W
Action Action Description Parameter
Replay Records valid control messages from a
node and resends them to other benign
neighbors
None
Blackhole Drops all data packets but participates
in the routing algorithm correctly
None
Wormhole Creates a wormhole between two col-





Creates a wormhole between two col-
luding nodes and tunnels routing pack-
ets between each other, but drops all
data packets
None
Packet forwarding protocols: Typically routing protocol implementations use
Internet Protocol (IP) as the packet forwarding protocol at the network layer. How-
ever, developers are free to choose other packet forwarding protocols more suitable
for the target network such as geographic forwarding for wireless ad hoc networks.
The DSDV implementation [111] for the Click Modular router [112] is using such a
protocol. Instead of IP, it is built on top of the Grid service [113] that is based on
geographic forwarding. We modify the malicious proxy so that it handles routing
messages packed into either IP or non-IP packets, and thus, we enabled the testing
of routing protocols that are built on top of non-IP protocols.
Routing at layer 2: Traditionally routing protocols operate at layer 3 (the network
layer) on top of IP (or some other packet forwarding protocols). However, several
recently developed routing protocols (e.g., BATMAN) operate at layer 2 (the data
link layer) where the nodes are attached to a unique Ethernet broadcast domain
and are agnostic to the network topology. Moreover, routing in such protocols relies
on MAC addresses instead of IP addresses. To enable adversarial testing of routing
protocols like BATMAN, our malicious proxy supports injecting malicious actions into
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routing messages even when they are encapsulated and forwarded as raw Ethernet
frames.
Attack strategy generation: The strategy generator is responsible for generating
a list of attack strategies that the target protocol should be tested against. For
example, consider the following strategies in case of AODV where the malicious proxy
is being instructed to duplicate each route request (AodvRreq) message 50 times and




Given the message format description of the protocol under test, these attack
strategies are generated based on the malicious actions listed in Tables 3.1 and 3.2
along with a value that decides the severity of that action. This attack strategy
generation is inspired from prior work [?, 31, 32]. To support the additional wireless
specific attacks listed in Table 3.3, we extended Turret’s basic set of malicious actions
with replay, blackhole, and wormhole attacks.
Support for multiple interfaces: Though Turret-W currently supports routing
protocols that rely on a single network interface out-of-box, the platform can easily be
extended to support routing protocols that leverage multiple network interfaces [114,
115]. In our current setup, each VM is equipped with only two network interfaces —
one dedicated for the target routing protocol and another for other purposes (e.g.,
controlling the VM). Therefore, to enable testing of routing protocols that leverage
multiple interfaces, we could equip the VMs with the necessary number of interfaces
and configure the network emulator to detect these interfaces.
3.2 Methodology
We demonstrate our platform on real-world implementations of five representa-
tive wireless routing protocols: AODV [24], ARAN [26], OLSR [23], DSDV [22], and
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BATMAN [89]. AODV is a well-known reactive (routes are determined on-demand)
routing protocol whereas ARAN is not only reactive but also a secure routing pro-
tocol. On the other hand, both OLSR, DSDV, and BATMAN are proactive (routes
are determined in advance) routing protocols. For AODV, ARAN, OLSR, and BAT-
MAN we obtained the implementations from their public repositories [93–95, 97],
while for DSDV, we obtained the implementation available in the Click modular
router source [96]. It is noteworthy that the DSDV implementation runs on geo-
graphic forwarding and the BATMAN implementation operates at layer-2 (the data
link layer).Next, we describe the attacker model, our experimental setup and the
selection of system parameters.
3.2.1 Attacker Model
We focus on performance attacks mounted by malicious participants to disrupt
the routing service thereby impairing the protocol performance, which is expressed
by a performance metric that is when evaluated gives an indication of the progress
the protocol has made towards completing its goals. To find such attacks, we measure
the protocol performance, using the given performance metric, during each execution
of the protocol in the presence of malicious participants in the network. The achieved
performance is compared against a baseline performance obtained from an execution
where all nodes are benign. We define an attack as follows:
Definition 1 - Performance Attack: When the performance difference between
a malicious execution and a benign execution is greater than a threshold, δ, we say
that the attack strategy has resulted in a successful attack.
Here, δ is a system parameter that depends on the protocol under test.
By directly testing real implementations running in their target operating systems,
our platform captures the intricate interactions between the protocol being tested and
the operating system components. In addition, the isolation and the reproducibility
offered by the emulated and virtualization-based environment help us discover bugs
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that impair the performance of the protocol even in a benign environment. Such bugs
cannot be found in a simulation environment. We define a bug as follows:
Definition 2 - Performance Bug: A performance bug is an implementation-level
error that limits the practical utility of the protocol in a benign execution by causing
100% loss of application packets sent by the source.
3.2.2 Experimental Setup
All our experiments are performed on a Dual-Quad core Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
E5410@2.33GHz with 8 GB RAM host machine. We use Ubuntu 10.04.4 LTS to serve
as the host OS. In all the experiments, we use 12 VMs, each allocated 128 MB RAM.
For AODV, we use Debian 6.0.5 with Linux Kernel 2.6.32 as the guest OS. One of
the advantages of our platform is that it allows us to execute binaries to run on their
target operating systems. For instance, since ARAN requires an older kernel, we use
Fedora Core 1 with Linux kernel 2.4.22 as the guest OS.
Our emulated network is a multihop wireless adhoc network. For the 802.11 MAC
layer, we use 802.11a with a bit rate of 6 Mbps and a propagation loss model (called
RangePropagationLossModel, available in NS-3) with a range of 100 meters for each
link. We perform our experiments using a static grid topology. As an application on
the VMs, we run iperf [116], a network benchmarking tool. In all the experiments,
the performance of the application we report is averaged over ten runs.
We obtain a performance baseline using benign testing, where we randomly select
pairs of source and destination nodes and transfer a stream of UDP packets between
them for 30 seconds. Since we do not intend to stress the protocol implementation,
we use a lower data rate of 128 Kbps so that the impact of attacks can be easily
observed – a low packet delivery ratio implies an attack [91,117].
As a performance metric, we use packet delivery ratio (PDR), i.e., a ratio of the
total number of packets (in our case, application packets) received by the destination
to the total number of packets sent by the source. PDR is easy to measure irre-
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spective of the underlying routing protocol as it can be computed from the results
produced by the application (i.e. iperf). Moreover, this metric does not require any
instrumentation to the routing protocol implementation, which supports our goal of
testing unmodified routing implementations. For each protocol, we capture the PDR
achieved in each malicious execution and compare it with the baseline PDR. Given
that we look for attacks that significantly degrade the performance, we argue that
the measured baseline PDR can be used as a ground truth since it is always closed
to the maximum (i.e., 100%) as per our experimental observation (see § 3.3- 3.7).
We select malicious node(s) randomly and inject malicious strategies during the
entire experiment. We vary the total number of adversaries from 1 to 4 (out of the
total 12 nodes) exhibiting a homogeneous behavior, i.e., we inject the same attack
strategy to each malicious node. For every attack strategy applied to the routing
messages, a malicious node drops application packets with a probability of p (a system
parameter) to affect the performance of the application.
To demonstrate the effect of blackhole attacks and wormhole attacks, we perform
experiments with three different configurations of adversaries: blackhole with one ad-
versary, blackhole with two adversaries, combination of wormhole and blackhole with
two colluding adversaries. When a blackhole attack strategy is injected, an adversary
participates benignly in the routing protocol but drops 100% of application packets.
The effect of a wormhole is noticeable in terms of application performance when com-
bined with a blackhole attack. Remember that except for blackhole and/or wormhole
attacks, we use the packet dropping probability p to drop application packets in all
other malicious executions.
The threshold δ, a system parameter, is dependent on the protocol under test. The
user can specify the threshold indicating the amount of performance loss he is willing
to tolerate. Alternatively, it can be determined from ground truth by recording the
observed performances for different attack strategies and select the threshold value
that will detect the attack manifested by the weakest adversary from the set of the
known attacks where a higher threshold means a more aggressive attacker. We relied
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on the second approach. We consider blackhole with one attacker as the weakest
adversary where the adversary drops all data messages but participates benignly in the
routing protocol. Moreover, we know all the protocols we are testing are susceptible
to blackhole attacks. Hence, we decide to choose 0.2 (i.e., 20%) as our threshold
so that our tool can detect the blackhole attack. Intuitively, any successful attack
strategy manifested by a relatively stronger adversary (attacks both the routing and
the data messages) worsens the performance. Hence, the chosen δ would also be able
to detect such attack strategies.
Overhead of Turret-W. Routing protocols usually use timeouts to prevent the
use of stale information or provide reliability of transmission. When these timeouts
expire, routing protocols take necessary measures such as removing stale entries from
routing tables, restarting new route discovery, or entering recovery state. Turret-W
can cause two different types of delays that will not be observed in real environment.
First, it can cause a processing delay when the network flow is heavier than the
network emulator capacity. Second, a malicious proxy can add delays while injecting
malicious actions. The first type of delay is due to the nature of emulation based
testing and can be prevented by over-provisioning. However, the impact of the second
type of delay needs to be measured. To evaluate the amount of delay introduced by
the malicious proxy, we performed experiments with AODV and OLSR protocols for
the malicious attacks listed in Table 3.4. We observed that the delay is in the order
of tens of µsec with a median of 40 µsec. Whereas the route expiration timeout used
in AODV and OLSR are 5 sec and 6 sec, respectively. This result demonstrates that
the computation of the malicious proxy of Turret-W does not have any significant
impact on the routing protocols due to the low overhead.
Scalability of Turret-W: The scalability of Turret-W depends on (a) the scalability
provided by the underlying emulator, and (b) the scalability of the routing protocol
under test. Turret-W leverages the emulation environment of NS-3 and hence is
subject to its limitations such as not being able to support large network sizes in
the emulation due to the overhead related to the management of the large number of
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threads in the NS-3 process [118]. As NS-3 is one of the most widely used network
emulators and the performance of network emulation is not within the scope of our
work, we choose a reasonable size of network consisting of 12 nodes and focus on
networks that can still operate correctly under a reasonable number of malicious
nodes (up to 30% of the total nodes).
3.3 Case Study 1: AODV
We now describe how we used Turret-W to test AODV [24]. All discovered attacks
and bugs are shown in Table 3.4.
3.3.1 Protocol Description
AODV establishes a path on-demand. Specifically, when a source desires to send
a message to a destination to which it does not have a valid route, it starts a route
discovery process by broadcasting a route request (RREQ) message to its neighbors.
Each node then forwards the first received RREQ by re-broadcasting it to its neighbors.
This process continues until the RREQ reaches the destination or an intermediate node
that has a valid route to the destination. In addition to forwarding the RREQ, each
intermediate node records in its routing table (i.e., precursor list) the address of the
neighbor from which it receives the first RREQ, forming a reverse path. Once the
RREQ reaches the destination node or an intermediate node with a valid route, the
node responds to the RREQ by unicasting a route response (RREP) message to its
precursor neighbor, i.e., its neighbor on the reverse path, which in turn relays the
RREP via precursor nodes back to the source node. From then on, the source node
keeps unicasting the data to the next hop neighbor as long as the route is valid.
A node maintains connectivity with its neighbors by periodically broadcasting
beacon messages (HELLO). Whenever the next hop becomes unreachable, the up-
stream node of the broken link propagates a route error (RERR) message to each of
its upstream neighbors. Following the reverse path, the RERR finally reaches each
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source node that contains the broken link on the route to its destination. A source
then re-initiates the route discovery if a route to the destination is still desired.
Implementation used: We use AODV-UU-0.9.6 implementation publicly available
from [93], which is RFC 3561 [119] compliant. The AODV-UU consists of two compo-
nents — a loadable kernel module (kaodv) and a user space daemon process (aodvd).
The kernel module intercepts and handles network packets by registering hooks (call-
backs) with the Linux kernel’s network stack. To register such hooks, kaodv uses the
Netfilter framework [120]. The daemon (aodvd) uses netlink socket to communicate
with kaodv and NETLINK ROUTE protocol to communicate with the kernel routing
table. We configure the protocol using the default values presented in [93].
3.3.2 Discovered Bugs
During the benign testing of AODV-UU, we discovered two unknown implemen-
tation bugs caused by a subtle interplay between the AODV-UU code and the kernel.
Bug 1. Kernel interaction order. In an attempt to measure TCP streaming
performance between a source and a destination that are multiple hops away from
each other, we observed that packets were not being delivered in the benign case. By
design, whenever an application sends a packet for a destination to which the route
is either invalid or unavailable, kaodv should hold the packet and notify aodvd to
perform a route discovery. After finishing the route discovery, aodvd should notify
the kernel to update the routing table and the koadv module to release the withheld
packet. Our investigation revealed that in the AODV-UU implementation, the order
of notification upon completion of a route discovery was incorrect, i.e., in the reverse
order.
This bug could not have been discovered if we had not attempted to measure
TCP performance where the first packet, i.e., SYN packet is crucial to establish the
connection. We also observed packet loss when initially using UDP, but like others,
66
we attributed this to the lossy behavior of UDP inside the wireless channel. We fix
the bug by reversing the order of the two notifications.
Bug 2. Route packets harder. In the process of obtaining a baseline using iperf,
we observed performance degradation over time despite the route being available and
valid in the routing table. When the kernel transport layer hands-over any locally
generated packet to the IP layer, kaodv receives the control of the packet via a hook
registered with Netfilter. Thus, kaodv is responsible for returning a value to Netfilter
so that Netfilter can decide what to do – accept/drop/ignore the packet or call the
hook again.
When kaodv receives the control for a packet and already has a valid route, kaodv
notifies Netfilter to continue processing the packet by returning NF ACCEPT. On receiv-
ing NF ACCEPT, Netfilter sends the packet down the network stack without performing
any further iptables tests [121]. As a result, Netfilter does not send the packet to the
correct next hop node on the route to the destination. We fix this bug by invoking
ip route me harder() inside kaodv before returning NF ACCEPT.
3.3.3 Discovered Attacks
Attack caused crashing. We discovered an implementation attack that can cause
all neighbors of a malicious node to crash. When a malicious proxy modifies an
RREQ message to be an RREP by changing the type of the RREQ message, a recipient
processes this altered RREQ message as an RREP message. The base RREP message
(i.e., 20 bytes) is smaller in length than a base RREQ message (i.e., 24 bytes) [119].
Therefore, a recipient of the malformed RREQ message processes the message as if
it were an RREP with extensions [119], and this causes AODV-UU of the receiver to
crash with a segmentation fault. Our inspection reveals that the root cause is an
integer overflow vulnerability in the AODV-UU code.
We show the related code snippet in Fig. 3.3. extlen is defined as an unsigned
integer (line 2) and there is no checking if the extension length matches the actual
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1.void NS_CLASS rrep_process(..., int rreplen, ...){
2. unsigned int extlen = 0;
3. AodvExtension *ext = rrep + RREP_SIZE;
...
4. while ((rreplen - extlen) > RREP_SIZE) {
// RREP_SIZE is 20
...
// process extention according to the type
...
5. /* read ext length from packet */
6. extlen += EXT_HDR_SIZE + ext->length;
// EXT_HDR_SIZE is 2




Figure 3.3.: Code snippet from AODV-UU showing the discovered integer overflow
vulnerability
message size. In this case, the received buffer length (rreplen) is 24 bytes. Therefore,
when the RREQ’s originator seq number field value becomes 21 or bigger, this code
will assume that the message has two extensions, one with 0 length and the other
with length 21 or larger. At line 6, it will first increase extlen to be 2, which is
the header size, then at the second iteration, it will add 2+21, and thus, extlen
becomes 25. This results in an integer overflow on the left hand expression of the
“while” condition at line 4, and therefore, the loop continues iterating. Later, the
code crashes with a segmentation fault. This vulnerability can be fixed by enforcing
careful type safety and boundary checking.
Attacks caused by malicious actions. We rediscovered several attacks on AODV-
UU based on message delivery and lying actions that decrease the PDR below the
accepted threshold. By design, AODV is known to be susceptible to these attacks [26,
90]. In case of our benign experiments, we observe a 98% PDR. Fig. 3.4(a)-3.4(d)
show the temporal impact of the attacks on PDR as a function of the number of
adversaries in the network. The impact of an attack increases as more nodes become
malicious in the network.
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Replay RREP. By replaying an RREP message received from a node, an adversary
can fool its benign neighbors to believe that the originator is their one-hop neighbor.
The benign neighbors that are at least two hops away from the actual originator
believe the adversary is the originator node as they never receive RREP messages
directly from the originator. This attack is more damaging than others because
replaying the periodic HELLO messages causes these pseudo-links never to expire. We

































































































































Figure 3.4.: Packet delivery ratio for the discovered attacks against routing messages
of AODV-UU
LieAdd RREP destsq. Whenever a node receives a control packet from another
node with the destination sequence number higher than what it has in its routing
table, the node selects the route via this other node. A malicious node adds a positive
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value with the destination sequence number of an RREP message, and this causes the
recipient to select the route through the malicious node. In the case of 4 adversaries
the PDR drops to 56%.
LieAdd RREQ reqid. Each RREQ message is uniquely identified by the request
identifier in conjunction with the originator’s IP. For each new route request, the
request identifier is incremented by one. No node ever responds to an older RREQ
message. A malicious node tricks the destination to respond to an RREQ with a
future request identifier so that the source will be left with only one available route,
i.e., through the malicious node. We observe that this attack causes the PDR to drop
as low as 62% as the number of adversaries increases.
Lie RERR type and Lie RREP hops. Modifying the type of an RERR to RREQ
causes the recipient to discard the packet. We find that adversaries can reduce the
performance to 71% by performing this attack. Similarly, when a malicious node sets
the hop count of an RREP to 0, the recipient selects the route through the malicious
node as the recipient thinks that it can reach the destination by 1 (=0+1) hop. We
observe that this attack causes the PDR to drop up to 73%.
Blackhole/wormhole attacks. We first tested AODV-UU against blackhole attack-
ers (malicious nodes that drop all the data packets). We then introduce an additional
blackhole node that colludes with the other blackhole node via a private channel to
perform a wormhole attack. The PDR drops to 50% with the increase in blackhole
nodes, whereas the PDR drops to 40% in case of the wormhole attack.
3.4 Case Study 2: ARAN
We now describe how we used Turret-W to test the implementation of ARAN
presented in [122]. We summarize all discovered attacks and bugs in Table 3.4.
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3.4.1 Protocol Description
ARAN [26, 122] is a secure reactive wireless routing protocol. ARAN introduces
authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation by utilizing digital signatures
on messages. Each node receives a certificate from a trusted certification authority
(CA). The protocol consists of a route discovery process utilizing three types of routing
messages: route discovery (RDP), route reply (REP), and route error (ERR). In
essence, the route discovery process of ARAN is similar to that of AODV. In addition,
ARAN guarantees end-to-end authentication. The routing messages are digitally
authenticated at every hop, which ensures that only authorized nodes participate at
each hop between the source and the destination.
Implementation used: We rely on the implementation arand -0.3.2 (referred be-
low as ARAND), publicly available from [95]. This user space routing daemon built
for Linux kernel 2.4 relies on the Ad hoc Support Library (ASL) [123] that provides
an interface to the kernel functionalities required by any on-demand ad hoc rout-
ing protocol. ASL takes care of adding/deleting routes in the kernel routing table
and notifying ARAND to initiate a route discovery for a destination in case of an
unavailable route. The ARAND daemon also utilizes the functionality provided by
the route check kernel module of ASL to delete stale routes. For the cryptographic
functionalities, it uses OpenSSL [124]. We use the default values for parameters as
used in [95].
3.4.2 Discovered Bug
Bug. Wrong postal address. We discovered an implementation bug during the
benign experiments in the setting of a multi-hop wireless network. By design, a
route discovery request should be flooded via broadcast and the response should be
delivered via unicast following the reverse path. However, in the implementation,
upon receiving a response, an intermediate node attempts to forward the response
directly to the source node (i.e., the originator of the route discovery) instead of the
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correct next hop node that is on the reverse route to the source. If the intermediate
node is more than one hop away from the source node, this response message cannot
be delivered to the source, and thus, the route discovery fails. We fix this bug by
letting the intermediate node use the correct next hop address to forward the route
response. This bug is due to an implementation mistake that exists inside the
aran processREP() function defined in aran.c and manifests in topologies having
nodes that are at least 3 hops away from each other.
3.4.3 Discovered Attacks
Attacks caused by message forwarding actions. We rediscovered several at-
tacks on ARAND based on malicious delivery that have a significant impact on the
performance. By design, ARAN is known to be susceptible to these attacks [91,125].
We observe a 99% PDR when no attacks take place. We then measure the changes in
the PDR achieved by ARAND as a function of the number of adversaries. Fig. 3.5(a)-
3.5(d) show the temporal changes in the PDR achieved by arand as a function of the
number of adversaries. The damage created by each attack increases with the number
of adversaries.
Divert REP, Drop ERR and Delay REP : By diverting a route reply (REP) mes-
sage and by dropping a route error (ERR) message, a malicious node can cause the
most damage among these attacks. Both these messages are sent via unicast by de-
sign, and therefore, if an intermediate malicious node drops or diverts these messages,
the upstream nodes on the route remain unaware of the on-going attack. Divert-
ing REP messages disrupts the completion of route discovery whereas dropping ERR
messages keeps the source unaware of the broken link and thus, prevents the source
from re-initiating a route discovery for the destination. Four malicious nodes can
drop the PDR to below 30% by diverting REP messages and to 40% by dropping






























































































































Figure 3.5.: Packet delivery ratio for the discovered attacks against routing messages
of ARAND
malicious node can reduce the PDR, but the impact is less significant as compared
to diverting REP messages.
Drop RDP. An intermediate malicious node can drop a route discovery (RDP)
message instead of re-broadcasting. This attack causes a slow decrease in PDR be-
cause every intermediate node re-broadcasts the RDP packet and therefore, even if
a malicious node does not forward the RDP, the destination eventually receives the
RDP message from other benign node(s).
Blackhole/wormhole attacks. We evaluate ARAND in the presence of blackhole/-
wormhole attackers in the network. In the presence of one blackhole attacker, the
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PDR drops to 80%. Adding another blackhole node drops the PDR to 42%. However,
when two blackhole nodes collude with each other to perform a wormhole attack, the
PDR drops to 28%.
3.5 Case Study 3: OLSR
We now describe how we used Turret-W to test OLSR [23]. All discovered attacks
are shown in Table 3.4.
3.5.1 Protocol Description
OLSR [23] is a proactive routing protocol based on the traditional link-state al-
gorithm where each node maintains topology information about the network by pe-
riodically exchanging link-state messages. OLSR minimizes the size of each control
message and the number of rebroadcasting nodes during each route update by em-
ploying a multipoint relaying strategy. During every topology update, each node in
the network selects a set of neighboring nodes, called multipoint relays, to retrans-
mit its packets. To select the multipoint relays, each node periodically broadcasts a
list of its one hop neighbors using HELLO messages. From the list of nodes in the
HELLO messages, each node selects a subset of its one hop neighbors, which cover
all of its two hop neighbors. Each node, then, disseminates information about the
subset, i.e., the set of multipoint relays, using topology control (TC) messages that are
retransmitted only by the multipoint relays of the node. Other nodes receiving these
TC messages process them but do not retransmit. Each node eventually determines
an optimal route (e.g., with minimum hops) to every known destination using the
topology information and updates its routing table. During data transmission, this
routing table is leveraged to determine route to a destination.
Implementation used: We use olsrd-0.6.3 (referred below as OLSRD) publicly
available from [94], which is RFC 3626 [126] complaint. This implementation is
a routing daemon that employs the ioctl() system call to communicate with the
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kernel and utilizes the NETLINK ROUTE protocol to manipulate the kernel routing table.
Unlike the above reactive protocols, it does not have any kernel module that intercepts
the network packets from the network subsystem. The daemon communicates with
other nodes over UDP and interacts with the kernel only when necessary, e.g., to
add/delete a route to/from the kernel routing table, to enable IP forwarding, etc. We
use the default values for parameters as used in [127].
3.5.2 Discovered Attacks
Attacks caused by malicious actions. We rediscovered several attacks in OL-
SRD based on message delivery and lying actions that have a significant impact on
the application performance. By design, OLSR is known to be susceptible to these
attacks [128–130]. We observe a 100% PDR in a benign scenario. We measure the im-
pact of the attacks on PDR as a function of the number of adversaries in the network.
Fig. 3.6(a)-3.6(d) show the temporal impact of the attacks on PDR as a function of
the number of adversaries in the network.
Replay HELLO. When a node receives a HELLOmessage from another node, it adds
the node to its neighbor list and starts broadcasting a new HELLO message. Based on
the HELLO messages, nodes learn about their one hop neighborhood and select their
multipoint relays that forward TC messages. By replaying a HELLO received from a
neighbor, a malicious node can disrupt the routing service of its benign neighbors
that are not direct neighbors of the originator of the HELLO. We observe the PDR to
be around 80% on average, regardless of the number of attackers in the network.
Drop TC 100%. A TC message traverses the entire network via multipoint relays.
TC messages are important because a node considers all the received TC messages to
infer the network topology and thus, establishes a route to every other node. There-
fore, an attack on TC messages is more damaging in that it will lead to inconsistencies










































































































Figure 3.6.: Packet delivery ratio for the discovered attacks against routing messages
of OLSRD
most 50% drop in PDR. Note that while selecting malicious nodes randomly in our
experiments, we do not add any constraints on the selection procedure.
Lie Pkt Seq. By design, OLSR follows the heterogeneous packet format where each
packet is ordered by a sequence number. Before sending out a packet, a malicious
proxy can replace the sequence number of the packet with a fake value (e.g. 0). This
malformed packet causes disruption in route calculation. Four malicious nodes can
drop the PDR of OLSRD up to 69%.
Blackhole/wormhole attacks. We measured the PDR obtained by OLSRD at the
presence of three different configurations of blackhole and wormhole attackers: one
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blackhole attacker, two independent blackhole attackers, a colluding pair blackhole
attackers connected through a private channel. With the increase in blackhole nodes
the PDR decreases as low as 50%. The combination of the wormhole and blackhole
attackers makes the attack more significant as the PDR drops to around 30%.
3.6 Case Study 4: DSDV
We now describe how we used Turret-W to test DSDV [22]. All discovered attacks
are shown in Table 3.4.
3.6.1 Protocol Description
The DSDV (destination-sequenced distance-vector) routing protocol is based on
the Bellman-Ford family of algorithms that utilize distance vectors to calculate paths,
between any two nodes in the network, along which data can be exchanged. DSDV is a
table-driven proactive routing protocol, and therefore, each node maintains a routing
table consisting of entries for every possible destination (not just the neighbors) along
with the cost to reach the destination. As a cost metric, the protocol uses hop-count
that is the number of hops a packet has to travel to reach its destination.
Each node periodically advertises its own routing table to its neighbors using
HELLO messages. In addition, any changes to the routing table are propagated to
other nodes as quickly as possible. These updates may lead to routing loops within
the network. To avoid routing loops, each routing update from the node is tagged
with a sequence number. Each node is free to choose an even number as the starting
sequence number for the routing updates where the node is listed as the destination,
but the node increments the sequence number by 2 for each periodic update. A
sequence number defines the freshness of the route to the destination. Note that one
node cannot change the sequence number tagged with such routing updates made by
others. However, in case of a broken/expired link to one of its neighbor, the node
can increment the sequence number by 1 and trigger an update mechanism. The
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nodes receiving this update check the sequence number and if it is an odd number,
they remove the corresponding entry from their routing table. Moreover, DSDV uses
settling time to dampen the route fluctuations due to node mobility.
Implementation used: We use the DSDV implementation presented in [111] that is
developed as part of the Grid project, which is built on the Click modular router [112]
and written in the click configuration language. The code is publicly available
from [96]. We refer to this implementation as DSDV-Click. All the states of the
routing protocol are maintained inside Click elements and are accessed through Click.
This implementation of DSDV can run either at the user-space using the Click user-
space process or the kernel-space using the Click Linux kernel module. We chose the
former due to its nature of high portability and easy debugging. At user-space, the
Click process loads a network tunnel (tun) device, which the process considers as a
file descriptor (e.g., /dev/tun0) and the operating system considers as a network in-
terface (e.g., tun0). The Click process exchanges packets with the operating system’s
network stack using this tunnel device. We use the default values for parameters as
used in [96].
3.6.2 Discovered Attacks
Attacks caused crashing. We discovered 4 implementation dependent attacks in
DSDV-Click that cause all the neighbors of a malicious node to crash.
Lie HELLO seq or dstseq with odd values : We found that there can be multiple
sequence numbers in a HELLO message. A node places its own sequence number (we
refer to it as seq) as well as the sequence number of each destination (we refer to it as
dstseq) that it is aware of into its HELLO messages. Whenever a node receives such a
HELLO message, it checks if each advertised route is active. If so, each of the received
sequence numbers must be an even number. Therefore, by simply lying on one or
more of these sequence numbers, i.e., by setting a positive odd number, a malicious
node can cause each of its neighbors to fail an assertion check and crash.
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Lie HELLO hopcount with 255 : While advertising routes to other destinations,
the originator node also includes hopcount (i.e., the number of hops to reach each of
them from the originator) into its HELLO messages. We found an attack where an
adversary can exploit the integer overflow vulnerability associated with the hopcount
field, which is one byte in length. The adversary maliciously advertises routes with
a value of 255 as the hopcount. Whenever one of the adversary’s neighbors receives
such advertisements and decides to update its routing table, the node adds 1 to the
received hopcount. This addition overflows the field causing the node itself to crash
due to an assertion failure.
Lie HELLO dstseq with even values : Turret-W helped us discover another crashing
attack that is very subtle and delicate in terms of its execution. In this attack,
the malicious node always modifies the route advertisements with a positive even
number as the destination sequence number (dstseq), which apparently looks correct
according to the protocol. However, a positive even number as dstseq is not correct
for an advertisement of an expired route. Therefore, whenever the malicious node
sends advertisements about the recently expired routes with a positive even number
as dstseq, an assertion check on the neighbors causes them to crash.
Attacks caused by malicious actions. Like other protocols, we also found sev-
eral attacks in DSDV-Click that impair the application performance. By design,
DSDV [22] is known to be susceptible to these attacks [92,131,132]. We measure the
changes in PDR achieved by the application as a function of the number of adver-
saries in the network where each node employs the DSDV-Click as the underlying
routing protocol. Fig. 3.7(a)-3.7(d) show the temporal changes in PDR achieved by
the application as a function of the number of adversaries in the network where each
node employs the DSDV-Click as the underlying routing protocol. In the benign case,
we observe a 100% PDR.
LieAdd HELLO seq and LieAdd HELLO dstseq. Recall that, in DSDV, each node
maintains a routing table consisting of entries for all possible destinations (not only


















































































































Figure 3.7.: Packet delivery ratio for the discovered attacks against routing messages
of DSDV-Click
messages (i.e., HELLO). Each of these messages contains the sequence number (seq) of
the node itself along with zero or more entries for other destinations that the node is
aware of at that very moment. Each additional entry includes the received sequence
number (dstseq) of the corresponding destination. A sequence number tagged with a
route defines the freshness of the route— a higher sequence number indicates a more
recent route. Therefore, whenever a node receives a HELLO message from another
node with the destination sequence number higher than what it is aware of, the node
selects this new route. A malicious node can exploit this fact and add a positive
even number to the destination sequence number contained in a HELLO message, and
this causes the receiving nodes to select the route through the malicious node. Note
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that instead of a positive even number, if the adversary chooses to add a positive
odd number, the attack will cause the neighbors to crash (as explained earlier) since
DSDV expects the sequence numbers defined by the originators to be positive even
numbers.
According to our experimental results, adding positive even numbers to the dstseq
field is more damaging than performing the same attack on the seq field. We can
attribute this to the fact that by modifying the seq field the adversary just offers a
more recent route to itself whereas by modifying the dstseq fields the adversary offers
more recent (but not legitimate) routes to other destinations containing itself on these
paths. Our experiment results show that the achieved PDR can drop from 62% to
20% with the increase in the number of adversaries when the adversaries perform
such attacks on the dstseq fields. However, in case of such attacks on the seq field,
we observe the PDR to drop from 86% to 72%.
Drop HELLO and Divert HELLO. The DSDV protocol requires nodes to exchange
only HELLOmessages as control packets pertaining to the routing service to establish a
routing table. Therefore, when a malicious node drops all of its own HELLO messages,
no other nodes within the network will ever be aware that the malicious node is active.
As a result, the source node selects a path longer than the shortest one if the malicious
node is on that shortest path. Similarly, when a malicious node sends its own HELLO
messages to randomly selected nodes instead of broadcasting the messages, only a few
nodes will know about the existence of this node. However, every node eventually
learns the route to the malicious node due to the route advertisement mechanism of
the DSDV protocol. The cost metric of these routes may not be the real optimum
value. Consequently, the source may end up using a longer path than the original
shorter one. In both the cases, we observe the PDR drops roughly from 95% to 65%
with the increase in the number of adversaries.
Replay HELLO. In this attack, an adversary re-broadcasts the HELLO messages
received from the neighboring nodes without any modification. As a result, any two
benign neighbors of the adversary that are multiple hops away from each other (in
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reality) consider themselves as 1-hop neighbors. Moreover, these false links never
expire as long as the attack continues. In this case, we observe the PDR changes
from 88% to 50% as the number of adversaries increases.
Blackhole/wormhole attacks. To test DSDV-Click in the presence of blackhole/-
wormhole attacks, we followed the same approach as for the other protocols. In the
presence of one blackhole attacker, we observe a PDR of 80% whereas the PDR drops
to 63% when we introduced another blackhole adversary. Note that in case of the
wormhole attack, the PDR drops to 49%.
3.7 Case Study 5: BATMAN
We now describe how we used Turret-W to test BATMAN [89]. All discovered
attacks are shown in Table 3.4.
3.7.1 Protocol Description
BATMAN is a proactive routing protocol for multi-hop wireless adhoc networks.
Unlike link-state protocols, BATMAN does not determine the whole path to the
destination, nor does it requires the global view of the network topology to route
packets. Instead, it requires each node to maintain only the best next hop to every
other node in the network using collective intelligence, similar to a distance-vector
protocol. Therefore, information about any topological change in the network does
not need to be instantly spread throughout the network.
Each node periodically broadcasts an originator message (OGM) to inform its
existence to its neighbors. The neighbors then rebroadcast the message to their
neighbors and so on and so forth. Therefore, every node is aware of the existence of
every other node in the network but records only the list of direct neighbors that it
has received such messages from. The best next-hop to each destination is selected
based on a metric called Transmit Quality (TQ), which measures the probability of
a successful transmission of a packet on the link between the node and the next-hop.
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As a result, each node only knows who to handover the data (encapsulated in Unicast
messages) destined to a node that is multiple hops away. The data is handed over
to the best next-hop neighbor, which in turn repeats the mechanism until reaches its
destination.
BATMAN utilizes a distributed ARP table (DAT) to enable nodes to perform
faster ARP lookup operations. In essence, DAT mechanism creates an ARP cache
distributed across the nodes by storing ARP entries as the ARP requests/responses
travel through the network. Unlike traditional ARP requests, given an IPv4 address,
a node can identify the group of nodes that may contain the related ARP entry by
utilizing a distributed hash function. Instead of broadcasting, requests are sent as
unicast messages (Unicast4Addr). If there is no response to the request, the requester
node can fallback to the traditional ARP mechanism and broadcast the ARP request.
Implementation used. We use Batman-adv-2014.1.0 (referred below as Batman-
adv) implementation publicly available from [97]. This implementation is a kernel-
space implementation running at the data link layer where both the routing infor-
mation and the data traffic are encapsulated and forwarded as raw Ethernet frames.
Hence, the network communication does not depend on IP. The protocol emulates
a virtual network switch connecting all the nodes as if the nodes are link local, and
therefore unaware of the network topology. To reduce the packet processing over-
head incurred by a user-space routing daemon, this version of the routing protocol is
implemented as a Linux kernel module.
3.7.2 Discovered Attacks
Attacks caused by malicious actions. We rediscovered several attacks on
Batman-adv based on message delivery and lying actions that decrease the PDR
below the accepted threshold. By design, the BATMAN protocol is known to be
susceptible to these attacks [89, 133]. In case of our benign experiments, we observe
a 97% PDR. We then measure the impact of the attacks on PDR as a function of the
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number of adversaries in the network. Fig. 3.8(a)-3.8(d) show the temporal impact of
the attacks on PDR as a function of the number of adversaries in the network. The

















































































































Figure 3.8.: Packet delivery ratio for the discovered attacks against routing messages
of Batman-adv
Reply OGM. By replaying the originator messages (OGMs) received from a node,
an adversary can induce its benign neighbors to consider the originator as a direct
neighbor since OGMs are used to announce the existence of nodes in the network.
This disrupts the routing service substantially since these replayed OGMs propagate
through the network thereby affecting the best next-hop selection at the nodes that
are closer to the attacker than to the originator. This attack is more damaging than
others since replaying OGMs causes these pseudo-links never to expire. We observe
that the PDR decreases from 24% to 6% with increasing adversaries.
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Lie OGM TQ. When sending an OGM, the originator initializes the transmit qual-
ity (TQ) field with its maximum value of 255. Prior to re-broadcasting an OGM, the
forwarding node sets the TQ field with a value that is the TQ of the received OGM
times its measured TQ towards the last hop node via which it received the OGM. As a
result, the TQ field of an OGM indicates the probability of successful transmission of
a packet towards the originator along the path the OGM has traversed. A malicious
node exploits this fact by setting the TQ field of all outgoing OGM to 255 thereby
enticing the neighbors to select itself as the best next-hop neighbor towards the orig-
inator. Our experiment results show that the PDR drops from 77% to 54% as the
number of adversaries increases.
Replay Unicast4Addr. When the source has to retrieve the MAC address of the
destination, it computes the group of nodes that may contain the related ARP en-
try and sends Unicast4Addr messages. In this attack, an adversary replays all the
Unicast4Addr messages containing either ARP request or response. Though this at-
tack cannot directly disrupt the routing table, it can overload the network with Uni-
cast4Addr packets when the number of adversaries increases in the network because the
adversaries collectively create a ripple effect by replaying each received Unicast4Addr
message. Moreover a Unicast4Addr message is quite smaller in length compared to a
message carrying data traffic. As a result, this ripple effect affects the forwarding of
the data traffic through the network. In our experiments, we observe the PDR drops
from 77% to 47% as the number of adversaries increases.
Lie Unicast type and Lie Unicast4Addr type. The source encapsulates the data
traffic in Unicast messages and hands over to the best next-hop neighbor and so does
the next-hop neighbor until the data reaches the destination. By lying on the type
field of a Unicast message, the adversary disrupts the data forwarding as the modified
Unicast message is not interpreted as the data message. We observe the PDR drops
from 70% to 9% with the increase in the number of adversaries. On the other hand,
when the adversary modifies the type field of a Unicast4Addr message, it can disrupt
the ARP request for a while. However, after a timeout, the requester falls back
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to traditional ARP mechanism and broadcasts the ARP request, which eventually
reaches the destination or some intermediate nodes that can reply with the related
ARP entry. Therefore, in case of this attack, we observe that the attack is only
effective when the number of adversaries in the network is larger than 2 causing the
PDR to drop to 63%.
Blackhole/wormhole attacks. We test Batman-adv against blackhole/wormhole
attacks in the same way as we did for other protocols. We observe that the PDR
drops from 60% to 47% as the number of blackhole attacker increases from 1 to 2.
When these two attackers collude to create a wormhole, the PDR drops to 42%.
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Table 3.4.: Attacks and bugs (re-)discovered by Turret-W. Attacks/bugs with











Attack* Lie RREQ type 2 Lie about RREQ message
type by setting to 2
(RREP) (causes crashing)
Attack [26] Lie RERR type 1 Lie about RERR message
type by setting to 1
(RREQ)
Attack [26,90] Lie RREP hop 0 Lie about the hop count in
route response to be 0
Attack [26] LieAdd RREQ
reqid 10
Increment the route request
id of route request by 10
Attack [26,90] LieAdd RREP
destsq 10
Increment the destination
sequence number of route
response by 10
Attack [26,90] Replay RREP Replay both route response
and hello messages
Attack [90] Blackhole Drop all data packets
Attack [26,90] Wormhole +
Blackhole
Colluding malicious nodes




components about the route
discovery in a wrong order
Bug* Route packets
harder
Returning NF ACCEPT from







Attack [125] Drop RDP 100% Drop each route request
message
Attack [125] Delay REP 2s Delay forwarding of route
response message by 2
seconds
Attack [125] Divert REP Divert route response
message
Attack [125] Drop ERR 100% Drop route error message
Attack [91] Blackhole Drop all data packets
Attack [91] Wormhole +
Blackhole
Colluding malicious nodes
drop all data packets











REP to the source instead








Replay HELLO Replay a HELLO message
received from a neighbor
Attack [128–
130]




Lie Pkt Seq 0 Lie about the sequence
number in olsr pkt to be 0
Attack [129,
130]











Attack* Lie HELLO seq
255
Lie about own sequence in




Lie about the dest.
sequences in HELLO




Lie about the hopcount in




Lie about the dest.
sequences in HELLO
messages with 254 (cause
crashing)
Attack [131] Replay HELLO Replay all HELLO
messages received from
neighbors
Attack [131] Drop HELLO
100%
Drop all HELLO messages
Attack [131] Divert HELLO Divert own HELLO
messages
Attack [132] LieAdd HELLO
seq 10
Increment the own sequence
number of HELLO
messages by 10












HELLO messages by 10
Attack [92,
131]
Blackhole Drop all data packets
Attack [131] Wormhole +
Blackhole
Colluding malicious nodes








Replay OGM Replay an OGM message
received from a neighbor
Attack [89] Lie OGM TQ 255 Lie about the transmit




message received from a
neighbor
Attack [89] Lie Unicast type 0 Lie about the type of an
Unicast message to be 0
Attack [89] Lie Unicast4Addr
type 0
Lie about the type of an
Unicast4Addr message to
be 0
Attack [133] Blackhole Drop all data packets
Attack [133] Wormhole +
Blackhole
Colluding malicious nodes
drop all data packets
3.8 Summary
Given the importance of routing in wireless networks, it is critical to subject their
implementations to adversarial testing before deployment. To aid developers in this
task, we develop Turret-W, an adversarial testing platform for wireless routing pro-
tocol implementations with minimal physical resources. We demonstrate our system
by evaluating actual implementations of AODV, ARAN, OLSR, DSDV, and BAT-
MAN. In total, we (re-)discovered 37 adversarial attacks capable of either crashing
the benign nodes or reducing their performance by disrupting the routing service and
3 implementation bugs that impair the protocol performance in benign environment.
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4 INFECTION MITIGATION IN EMERGING NETWORKS
With the proliferation of smartphones, Internet-of-Things, the number of wireless
devices with complex capabilities has rapidly increased. While the openness of such
wireless devices—supported by various open source operating systems like Google’s
Android [37], Contiki [11], FreeRTOS [38], Raspbian [136], and their development
platforms—induces developers’ motivation, it also introduces new propogation vectors
for mobile malware. Recent reports show a surge of malware incidents targeting
smartphones [39–41] and IoT devices [42–44].
Significant research focused on propagation modeling, detection, and application
profiling of malware in the context of wired networks [48–52]. Those results do not
model mobile malware which spreads directly from device to device by using short-
range communication such as WiFi, Bluetooth or NFC [9, 45–47]. Mobile malware
propagation has been studied using mean field compartmental models [137] which
assume that each infected node will contact every neighbor once within one time
step, i.e., the infectivity is equal to the connectivity. Such models do not take into
account that mobile malware does not spread at an even contact rate, as spreading
requires devices to be within each other’s proximity which in turn depends on user
mobility. Most previous research on mobile malware has either not considered mo-
bility [138–140] or has given limited considerations to it [141, 142]. Approaches that
have considered mobility have used popular models like the random waypoint model
which, as it has been shown, does not realistically mimic human mobility [143].
The content of this chapter is based on the joint work with R. Potharaju, C. Nita-Rotaru, S. Sarkar,
and S.S. Venkatesh [134,135]
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While there has been work studying mobile malware propagation, the problem
of infection containment in wireless networks was less studied. The work of [144]
analytically studies containment of infection in a mobile network through counter-
measures such as reducing communication range of nodes during an infection out-
break. The work does not consider realistic mobility models and does not propose
concrete protocols to deploy and activate such countermeasures. The work in [145]
introduces replicative and non-replicative patch disseminations assuming a network
cost function and proves that the dynamic control strategies have a simple optimal
structure. However, the impractical determination of the healer activation time and
the lack of inclusion of the resource cost incurred by each patch dissemination make
the techniques difficult to apply directly to energy constrained realistic scenarios.
In this work, we take the first step towards designing countermeasures for mal-
ware propagation under the presence of realistic mobility in a practical scenario. We
investigate the dependence of infection spread on the underlying mobility model in
order to systematize the design of countermeasures. We introduce the concept of
healers to mimic the recovery process in a standard epidemic model and we focus on
static healers, (i.e., immobile) healers, which represent a realistic model because they
can be directly mapped to real-world scenarios. For instance, static healers can be
considered as cellular base stations (where no two stations cover the same cell in most
cases) and the mobile nodes can be considered as users carrying mobile phones (mov-
ing with a certain mobility model). In contrast to the mechanism shown in [141],
our static-healers are not white-worms and do not deactivate infected nodes. Our
contributions are:
• We show that the infection spread in mobility models that mimic human be-
havior is slower than standard mobility models due to different contact rate
and spatial distribution characteristics. We compare the Truncated Levy Walk
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(TLW) and Random Waypoint (RWP) mobility models and show that the epi-
demic spread in TLW is relatively slower compared to RWP. This finding indi-
cates that when designing countermeasure mechanisms, the time constraints are
less tight than believed and that time-dependent assumptions can be relaxed to
some extent, resulting in relatively lower consumption of energy.
• We model countermeasures to malware spread using static healer nodes. Static
healers once placed in the area, act independently to deploy a patch when they
sense nodes in their proximity. A healer-based solution optimizes: (i) the time
it takes to heal the entire system by patching all the infected nodes and (ii) the
total number of patches broadcasted. We formulate the optimal solution based
on static healers as a T-Cover problem , which is NP-Complete.
• We use ORACLE, a log(n) greedy approximation algorithm, that computes the
optimal healing time knowing the placement of the static healers and the future,
i.e. the exact time instances when the infected nodes arrive within each healer’s
proximity.
• We propose a novel healer placement strategy using blue-noise distribution gen-
erating Poisson Disk Sampling. We show that unlike random placement that
results in many overlapping healers which cover the same area, our method al-
lows healers to cover disjoint areas, thus enabling them to independently cover
more infected nodes.
• We design three families of healer protocols: randomized (RH), profile (PH),
and prediction (PDH), that allow for a trade-off between the energy consumed
for sending patches and the time taken to recover the entire system. The intu-
ition behind each protocol is as follows: (1) RH uses randomization to ensure
simplicity in healers’ functionality and achieves reasonable performance. (2) PH
uses system feedback to optimize the energy consumed for sending patches, but
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may result in a larger recovery time. (3) PDH predicts the cost of waiting for
a suitable time instance to deploy a patch thereby achieving a smaller recovery
time but has the side-effect of utilizing more patches. We compare our protocols
with the ORACLE protocol and show through simulations that despite lacking
knowledge of the future, our healers obtain a recovery time within a 7.4x∼10x
bound of the ORACLE.
4.1 System Model
In this section, we construct a framework for analyzing the propagation of malware
over a mobile ad hoc network that relies on epidemic theory to capture both the spatial
interaction of nodes and the temporal dynamics of infection propagation.
4.1.1 Mobility Models
Due to the difficulties in adapting real-trace data to long running simulations [140],
we decided to use analytical models derived from real-trace data instead. Specifically,
we use the Random Waypoint (RWP) and Truncated Levy walk (TLW) mobility mod-
els to generate synthetic mobility traces. We selected RWP because it is a typical
mobility model used to study mobile malware propagation. We selected TLW be-
cause it provides more realistic representations of statistical patterns found in human
mobility. Unless otherwise noted, we use a node velocity of 0.6 m/s to mimic low
velocity realistic human mobility in both mobility models throughout this chapter.
Random Waypoint (RWP): RWP is a widely used mobility model [146–148] and
includes pause times between changes in direction and/or speed [25]. A mobile node
begins by staying in one location for a certain time period (pause time). Once this
























Figure 4.1.: Tracing the path of a single node: (a) for RWP and (b) for TLW
and a speed that is uniformly distributed between [vmin, vmax]. The mobile node
then travels toward the newly chosen destination at the selected speed. Upon arrival,
the node pauses for a specified time period and starts the whole process again (see
Fig. 4.1(a)). RWP is heavily used for mobile ad hoc network simulation [149] to
simulate mobile nodes that can move randomly and freely in a mobility area without
any restriction. This model is super-diffusive because of high-probability of long
flights. On the contrary, human walks have heavy-tail flight distributions [150] that
are not captured by common mobility models such as RWP.
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The initial random distribution of mobile nodes is not representative of the manner
in which nodes distribute themselves when moving as the instantaneous mobile node
neighbor percentage possess high variability [151]. We use the approach suggested
by [149] and discard the initial 1000 seconds of simulation time produced by RWP
in each simulation trial.
Truncated Levy Walk (TLW): Based on the empirical studies performed on hu-
man mobility data collected through moblie devices carried by humans, Rhee et.
al. [143] reported that human walks performed in outdoor settings of tens of kilome-
ters resemble a truncated form of Levy walks commonly observed in animals such as
spider monkeys, birds and jackals. A Levy walk is a type of random walk in which the
increments are distributed according to a heavy-tailed probability distribution, i.e.,
their tails are not exponentially bounded. The distribution used is a power law of the
form y = x−α where 1 < α < 3. TLW is a random equivalent mobility model for
human walks in that it can describe some important characteristics of human walks
(e.g. flight length, pause time and inter-contact time) despite being a random model.
Inter-contact times are defined to be the time durations between two consecutive
meeting events of the same two nodes. Human walks have long inter-contact times,
which is intuitive in a sense that as humans do not move much, they will not meet
each other very often. The distributions of these inter-contact times, which follows a
power-law distribution with an exponential tail, are similar to those observed in case
of Levy walks. Similarly, the heavy-tail distributions of flight length and pause time
can be captured by Levy walkers moving in a confined area. Intuitively, Levy walks
consist of many short flights and exceptionally long flights that nullify the effect of
such short flights (see Fig. 4.1(b)).
Note that while there are other recent human mobility models similar to TLW
such as the ones proposed by Lee et al. [152], Boldrini et al. [153] and Isaacman et
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al. [154], our end goal is to advocate the use of one of these human mobility models
while designing defenses against epidemic outbreaks.
4.1.2 Infection and Recovery Models
We adapt two classic epidemic models (SI and SIR) to take into account mobility.
First we give a brief overview of the SI and SIR models, then describe how we use
them to model malware propagation and node recovery in a mobile network.
SI Model. The SI-model is a two-state compartmental epidemic model, i.e., a node
can stay in one of two states: susceptible and infected. A susceptible node is vulnerable
and can be exploited to be infected which in turn can infect other susceptible nodes.
In this model, once a susceptible node is infected, it stays that way. The parameter
that characterizes the model is the infection rate, β.
SIR Model. The SIR Kermack-McKendrick model [155] assumes that an infected
node can be recovered. Specifically a node can be in one of the following states:
susceptible, infected, and recovered. Nodes flow from the susceptible group to the
infected group and then to the recovered group [156] as shown in Fig. 4.2. The model
is characterized by two parameters, the infection rate β and the recovery rate α.
S I R
- Infection Rate: transition 
  from susceptible to infected status 
- Recovery Rate: transition 
  from infected to recovered status 
Figure 4.2.: SIR model: S, susceptible; I, infected; R, recovered
Mobile Infection Model. The SI model makes the unrealistic assumption that
each infected node will contact every neighbor once within one time step, i.e., the
infectivity is equal to the connectivity. To take into account mobility, we assume the
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nodes are moving according with a mobility model and we define infection spread as
a function of a parameter c which we call the probability of successful transmission.
At each time step, for every node X, we find the neighbors of X that are capable
of infecting X. For each of these neighbors, we generate a random number from a
uniform distribution between [0, 1] and if this value is smaller than c, then X becomes
infected.
Mobile Recovery Model. We adapt the SIR epidemic model as follows. Infection
is modeled as in the mobile infection model above. We map node recovery through a
healer that will change the state of an infected node to recovered through a healing
mechanism. Once recovered, a node can no longer be infected, thus if no new nodes are
added the infection will eventually disappear. The healing mechanism is distributed
through a patch, a healer can send at most once during an interval of time called
epoch, denoted as τ . We assume that healers are static, resource constrained, and act
independently. Our assumptions also include that once an infected node receives a
patch, the node instantaneously applies the patch and becomes completely recovered.
We assume that there is no packet loss but note that it is straightforward to extend
our model to a model having packet loss.
This model is characterized by the way the healers are placed and by the frequency
with which they send patches. All healers are activated once the number of infected
nodes in the system reached a system-wide parameter.
4.2 Infection Dynamics
In order to understand the infection dynamics of the two mobility models, we first
describe our methodology and then explain the results that we observed.
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4.2.1 Methodology
We use the infection model described in previous section with the parameter that
controls the infection rate, c = 0.3 [157] to mimic a more realistic infection scenario
where infection spreads slowly. We generate RWP traces by using the methodology
outlined in [158] and TLW traces by using the algorithm outlined in [143]. We perform
our simulations using NS-3 [104]. We simulate the behavior of a system with 100,
200, and 300 nodes in a fixed area. All results have been averaged over ten simulation
runs.
We define an inversion point to be the time instant where 50% of the population
is infected. We use this metric to indicate the first point in time where the number of
infected nodes surpasses the susceptible ones, thus inverting the scenario. Intuitively,
an inversion point characterizes how fast the infection is propagating in an epidemic
system.
4.2.2 Results
Figure 4.3 shows the infection dynamics in RWP and TLW mobility models. Ob-
serve that the inversion point for RWP occurs quite early in the simulation (Fig. 4.3(a)
indicates a time around 500 seconds) in comparison with TLW (Fig. 4.3(a) indicates
times between 1500-3000 seconds). This indicates that the time required to infect the
system is far less in case of RWP differing almost by a factor of 3 from TLW. To the
best of our knowledge, this phenomenon has not been observed before as most earlier
research [141, 142] has studied these mobility models in isolation. As protocols are
to be designed mostly for realistic mobility models (TLW in this case), this comes as
a good news in that certain assumptions such as time-constrained-ness of a protocol








































































Figure 4.3.: Infection dynamics: (a) Inversion point in RWP and TLW (the infection
spread is slower in TLW) (b) Explaining the slow propagation (the contact rate in
TLW is less than RWP)
We gain insights into the reasons behind the slow infection propagation for TLW
by using two metrics: (i) contact rate, and (ii) spatial distributions of node mobility.
1. Contact Rate: Contact rate is the average number of nodes encountered by
any given node over the duration of simulation. We plot an empirical cumulative
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distribution curve (ECDF) of the contact rate in Fig. 4.3(b) for RWP and TLW.
Observe that the median contact rate of nodes in case of RWP is almost always higher
than that in TLW. The same effect can be observed for the 95th percentile indicating
that in RWP, a given node comes in contact with a relatively higher number of nodes
thereby increasing its chances of infecting other nodes or getting infected by other
infected nodes.
2. Spatial Distributions: The spatial distribution (i.e., frequency of visits in the
simulation area) of the mobility models reveals another reason behind the slow infec-
tion propagation. In order to evaluate the spatial distribution of infected nodes that
move according to each of the models, we take an approach similar to [159]. Specif-
ically, we divide the simulation area into small size cells (e.g., divide a 1000x1000m2
into 20x20m2 size cells) and characterize each one of them using a histogram that
captures the duration of how long an infected node stays in a particular cell. We end
the simulation after 50,000 seconds.
Fig. 4.4(a) shows the resulting spatial distribution and contour lines for a particu-
lar simulation run using RWP. We observe that the spatial distribution has a peak in
the middle of the area, i.e., an infected node is most likely to be found in the central
cells of the simulation area and the probability that a node is located at the border
of the area goes to zero. Fig. 4.4(b) shows the spatial distribution and contour lines
for TLW. Observe that the non-homogeneous behavior seen in the case of RWP is
absent in the case of TLW, i.e., TLW exhibits a homogeneous spatial distribution.
The reason for the non-homogeneous behavior in RWP is well known [159–161]. In
short, RWP chooses a uniformly distributed destination point rather than a uniformly
distributed angle. This means that nodes located at the border of the simulation area
are very likely to move back toward the middle of the area. However, this is not the










































































Figure 4.4.: Spatial distribution of mobility models: (a) RWP: The non-homogeneous
distribution of node mobility indicates the center to be the most frequented region.
(b) TLW: The nearly-homogeneous distribution of node mobility indicates that all
regions are equally frequented.
each step, an infected node chooses a direction randomly from a uniform distribution
of angle within [0, 2pi], a finite flight time randomly based on some distribution, and
its flight length and pause time from some chosen probability distributions. In the
long run, the positions of the random walker (infected node in our case) has been
shown to converge to another distribution, called the Levy stable distribution, which
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leads to super-diffusive paths, thus making the infected nodes cover the area in a
nearly homogeneous manner.
In summary, in case of RWP, depending on the origin of the infection, the spread
can progress rapidly because most nodes have to pass through a common point in
the center which also explains why the contact rate of the nodes is higher than that
in TLW. In case of TLW, due to the underlying homogeneous behavior, the rate
of infection propagation is nearly the same irrespective of the point of origin of the
infection.
Impact on the design of countermeasures:
• Static healers placement: In case of RWP, positioning a few static healers
somewhere near the center of the field in a non-overlapping manner should
suffice because most nodes will traverse the central point in the field anyways.
However, this is not the case for TLW, because the node distribution is uniform
across the field, thus requiring a way to optimize healer placement such that
they cover as much field as possible.
• Healer patch dissemination: In case of designing a healer for TLW, having a
higher patch dissemination rate will result in a lot of patches being delivered to
the same set of nodes since due to the low velocity (and thus low contact rate)
many nodes may continue to stay within the proximity of the healer. Therefore,
for a system optimizing energy, healer patch dissemination is a function of the
contact rate (details in § 4.3.5).
4.3 Defense Protocols Based on Static Healers
In this section, we discuss defense protocols against mobile malware. We first
present the problem definition, formally define the static optimal healer activation
problem, and design a greedy approximation algorithm. We discuss strategies for
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healer placement and present three families of static healers heuristics: randomized,
profile, and prediction.











timeHealer Node x Mobile Node
Figure 4.5.: Healer activation problem: Without information about its future states,
predict when to broadcast a patch so that the healing time is optimized
4.3.1 Problem Definition
Healers have the ability to broadcast a patch periodically at every epoch τ . We
consider the decision problem of when the healer node should be activated (i.e.
switched on) within this time period to deliver a patch, to optimize along two di-
mensions: (i) the time it takes to heal the entire system, and (ii) the total number of
patches broadcast.
We assume that healers are not susceptible to the infection. In addition to this,
we also assume that healers can sense the number of neighbors surrounding them but
cannot determine which of the nodes are infected/susceptible/recovered1. Note that
this increases the complexity of the problem significantly. Consider the example in
Fig. 4.5. At time slot 1, if the healer decides to utilize its patch, it will heal at most
three nodes whereas at time slot m, it can heal at most two nodes and at time slot
n, it can heal at most five nodes. An oracle that has access to the future will pick a
1Identifying the state of a node based on the interaction with the node is quite similar to the problem
of detecting rootkits using the intrusion detection systems (IDSs) that rely on the system itself. In
fact, when a system is compromised by rootkits, IDSs must not rely on the system [162]. Hence our
healers treat each node equally.
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time slot that will make an effective use of the patch to heal the maximum number
of nodes (in this case, time slot n). However, in practice, the future is not available
to healer nodes.
We ask the questions: What is an effective strategy for positioning the static
healers so that two healers will avoid healing the same set of infected nodes? and
How does the healer decide whether it should deliver the patch or wait in anticipation
of a higher number of nodes in the future? Without loss of generality, we consider
that the energy consumption in delivering the patch is much higher than any other
communication activity initiated by a healer. Intuitively, we are solving the problem
of effectively distributing a patch without knowing the arrival distribution of infected
nodes.
4.3.2 Design of an Oracle Optimal Healer
In the following, we formally define the static optimal healer activation problem,
and design a greedy approximation algorithm instead.
Let us call the task of designing a strategy for an optimal healer as the T-Cover
problem.
Definition 1 (T-Cover Problem). Let I be the set of all infected nodes in the
network and T =
⋃
i Ti, where each Ti is the set of infected nodes seen by all the
healers at time instance i. Furthermore, let no two healers exist within the range of
each other, and a patch from a healer can heal all infected nodes within its range and
will consume one time unit. The T-Cover problem of It = (I, T ) is to find a set
W ⊆ T such that it covers the entire set of infected nodes I (i.e.
⋃
Ti∈W
Ti = I) and
W has minimum cardinality.
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Here, the cost ci associated with Ti is equivalent to the time instance value, i.e., i.
Minimizing the total cost
∑
i∈W ci is equivalent to minimizing both the total time to
recover the infected nodes and the required number of patches to do so. For example,
let I = {1, 2, 3, 4} and T = {T1, T2, T3} where T1 = {1}, T2 = {1, 2, 3} and T3 = {3, 4}
be the sets of infected nodes seen by the healer, then the T-Cover is W = {2, 3}
meaning that a patch should be deployed at time t = 2 and t = 3 for optimality. We
can restate this optimization problem as a decision problem.
Definition 2 (T-Cover Decision Problem). Given a system It = (I, T ), the T-
Cover decision problem is to determine whether It has a T-Cover of size at most
k.
In other words, we wish to determine whether there is a set W ⊆ T such that
|W | ≤ k and
⋃
Ti∈W
Ti = I. In essence, T-Cover problem is the same as the min
set cover problem, which we define below for completeness.
Definition 3 (Min Set Cover (MSC) Problem). Let S = {S1, S2, ..., Sm} be a
collection of finite sets, where Si’s elements are drawn from a universal set U =
⋃m
i=1 Si. The MSC of Is = (U,S) is a set C ⊆ S such that
⋃
Si∈C
Si = U and C has
minimum cardinality.
For example, assume U = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and S = {S1, S2, S3, S4}, where S1 =
{1, 2, 3}, S2 = {2, 4}, S3 = {3, 4} and S4 = {4, 5}. The minimum set cover is
C = {S1, S4}. Similarly, we can restate this optimization problem as a decision
problem.
Definition 4 (Min Set Cover (MSC) Decision Problem). Given Is = (U,S), the
MSC decision problem is to determine whether Is have a set cover of size at most k.
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In other words, we wish to determine whether there is a set C ⊆ S such that
|C| ≤ k and U =
⋃
Si∈C
Si. As the MSC decision problem is NP-Complete, it
follows that the T-Cover decision problem is NP-Complete.
Algorithm 2: Greedy Approximation (ORACLE)
Input Let I be the list of all infected nodes, Si be the set of infected nodes
seen at each time i, wi be the list of costs associated with each arrival at i
Initially:
R is the set of elements that are not covered as yet
C is the set of covered elements
w is the weight vector
R = I and C = φ
repeat
let Si be the set that minimizes
wi
|Si∩R|
C = C ∪ {Si}
R = R− Si
until R = φ
return C
According to the above theorem, we can employ any heuristic that solves the set
cover problem to solve the T-Cover problem. Algorithm 2, based on the greedy set
cover algorithm [163], gives a greedy approximation for the T-Cover. The algorithm
takes as input the arrival times of the infected nodes. Here, Si is the set of infected
nodes seen at any one time instant and we equate the weight vector wi to the time of
arrival – cost of healing nodes at a later time is higher because it introduces delay. The
main loop iterates for O(n) time, where |I| = n. The minimum W can be found in
O(log m) time, using a priority heap, where there are m sets in a set cover instance
giving us a total time of O(nlog(m)). Fig. 4.6 shows that even in the presence of
hundreds of thousands of node sets, we are able to compute the optimal solution in
under 8 seconds.
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Figure 4.6.: Oracle Performance (The algorithm terminates in less than 8 seconds
even in long simulation scenarios)
4.3.3 Effective Healer Placement
Since the healers are static, the healer placement has an impact on our defense
protocols and thus their coverage area depends on their placement strategy. Our
simulations showed that a naive placement using uniform random distribution resulted
in a scenario where many healers ended up covering the same region thereby leaving
a lot of uncovered area. Another naive approach is the grid placement of healers in
which healers cover the entire arena and therefore each mobile node will always be in
the range of at least one healer. This approach would require N number of healers
to cover the entire arena which could be a very large number depending on the size
of arena and the range of healers2,3. Note that the infection containment problem
becomes trivial in case of grid placement. For instance, if healers were placed in grids,
the defense protocol would require all the healers to broadcast one patch each at the
same time instance t and thus, the entire system would be recovered in one second at
2For an arena of 500 × 500 (meter)2 and 20 meter healer-range, N would be at least 157, whereas
we used N = 20 healers for the same setup.
3N would no longer be a fixed number
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the cost of N patches. However, in realistic environments, it is not practical to have
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Figure 4.7.: Healer placement using Poisson Disk Sampling and Uniform Sampling
(Poisson Disk Sampling approach increases the coverage of the simulation area)
For our healer placement strategy, what we need is a type of a constraint that re-
jects certain configurations that place healers very close to each other. This problem
can be directly reduced to a problem from the field of computer vision which involves
producing sampling patterns with a blue noise Fourier spectrum. Formally, the prob-
lem can be defined as the limit of a uniform sampling process with a minimum-distance
rejection criterion. Successive points are independently drawn from the uniform dis-
tribution [0, 1]. If a point is at a distance of at least R from all points in the set
of accepted points, it is added to that set. Otherwise, it is rejected. The choice of
R controls the minimum allowable distance between points. This procedure called
Poisson Disk Sampling [164] has been actively studied and many efficient algorithms
exist. We adapted this algorithm by setting R = 2r, where r is the range of our each
healer. Fig. 4.7 clearly highlights the merits of using this specific sampling process -
healers are no longer close to each other and hence cover more of the simulation area.
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4.3.4 Family of Randomized Healers
We first present a heuristic where a healer randomly decides at what time within
an epoch to send a patch. Note that a healer will decide to send a patch regardless
of the number of nodes in its vicinity. Fig. 4.8 depicts the state machine of the
randomized healer (RH). It contains two states, an initialization phase where an
epoch timer is started and an execution phase where the healer prepares to deliver
a patch. The epoch timer fires a callback function that has two responsabilities: (i)
pick a random time from the interval [0, τ ], where τ is the epoch length, and use this
random time to schedule a broadcast, called the patch timer and (ii) re-schedule the
epoch timer to be fired for the next epoch. τ depends on the range of the healer and
velocity of the mobile node. When the patch timer expires, the healer broadcasts a








if rand() < p:
    Schedule(Patch)
0 1
Figure 4.8.: State machine of a Randomized Healer
Algorithm 3 outlines the pseudo-code for the randomized healer. Varying p will
generate a family of randomized healers. On one hand, setting p = 1 (RH(p=1)) makes
the healer broadcast a patch at every epoch and thus attempts to minimize the time
it takes to heal the system. However, notice that the number of patches delivered
would be equal to Dsim
τ
, where Dsim is the simulation duration. On the other hand,
setting p < 1 makes the healer broadcast a patch only during certain epochs. The
time taken to heal the system is inversely proportional to p whereas the number of
patches delivered is directly proportional to it.
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Algorithm 3: Randomized Healers (RH)
Input Epoch length τ and patch deployment probability p
Initially:
start epoch timer(τ)
Upon the expiration of epoch timer:
select a duration t randomly from (0, τ)
start patch timer(t)
start epoch timer(τ)
Upon the expiration of patch timer:
Broadcast a patch with probability p













if num_neighbors() > threshold:




Figure 4.9.: State machine of a Profile Healer
One limitation of the RH approach is that healers may send more patches than
needed since they decide to send patches regardless of how many infected nodes are
present in their proximity. We propose a new approach, PH, where a healer attempts
to learn the arrival distribution of nodes and subsequently determine whether or not
it is cost effective to deliver a patch. The decision is made based on a threshold that
captures the number of nodes in its vicinity.
Each healer can exist in one of three states as depicted in Fig. 4.9 - an initialization
phase which prepares the healer, a learning phase where the healer passively records
the number of neighbors it is observing during each epoch (in general), and an exe-
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cution phase where the healer utilizes information that it learnt during the previous
phase to decide whether or not to deliver a patch. Algorithm 4 describes this healer
(PH) in detail. In the initialization phase, each healer sets its own state to LEARNING
and starts the sensing timer (sensing timer) with a duration of 1 second. Upon the
expiration of sensing timer, the healer checks whether the observation time T has
elapsed yet. If not, the healer records the number of neighbors (num of neighbors) in
its proximity and restarts sensing timer. When the observation time T has elapsed,
the healer first estimates the threshold from the recorded information and moves to
the EXECUTION state. Now at every second, the healer checks whether the number of
neighboring nodes exceeds the threshold. If so, the healer deploys a patch and starts
a timer (epoch timer), which expires at the end of the current epoch. Until then, the
healer does no sensing at all. Upon the expiration of epoch timer, the healer starts
sensing again by setting sensing timer.
The goal of learning phase is to learn the distribution of node arrivals specific to a
healer’s locality for a certain observation time T which is a multiple of τ . Specifically,
the goal is to learn a threshold of nodes that will determine whether the healer should
send a patch or not. We use two metrics described below.
• MSD = Mean + 1.5 × Standard Deviation: MSD is well-known for normal
distributions and makes the healer broadcast a patch only if the number of
neighbors exceeds its estimate of the 95th percentile.
• M = Median: M is the median of the observed distribution. Median is very
robust to outliers – it handles cases where a healer observes a burst of infected
nodes during an epoch.
During our simulations, we observed that relying solely on a threshold was leading
to a wastage of patches - due to the low contact rate we observed in §4.2.2. Consider
Fig. 4.10 which depicts the healing sequence of a set of five healers during the epochs
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Algorithm 4: Profile healers (PH)
Input Epoch length τ , observation time T such that T > 1
Initially:
t← 0, ∆← 1, state← LEARNING, next epoch time← 0
Start sensing timer(∆) ⊲ Start timer with duration ∆
Upon the expiration of sensing timer:
t← t+∆
if state = LEARNING then
if t < T then
Record num of neighbors in proximity
else
Estimate threshold from the recorded num of neighbors at each ∆
state← EXECUTION




if current num of neighbors > threshold then
Broadcast a patch





Upon the expiration of epoch timer:
t← next epoch time































Figure 4.10.: Motivating backoff: Most consecutive patches do not heal infected nodes
indicating that it is better to backoff after a patch delivery
of one simulation run. Points situated at 0 indicate that the healer deployed a patch
as the number of neighbors was above the threshold but the patch did not heal any
infected nodes. Any other number indicates the number of infected nodes healed with
that patch. Observe that most patches are going to waste, i.e., they are not healing
any nodes. In the worst case, it takes at least healer range
node velocity
seconds for a node to go out
of range of a healer. Therefore, for shorter epochs, consecutive patches are delivered
to the same set of nodes. We address this issue by introducing a random backoff, i.e.,
once a patch has been broadcast, the healer selects a random backoff delay κ from
the interval (0, η), where η is the maximum backoff in epochs, and skips that many
epochs. Algorithm 5 also describes the backoff algorithm in detail. We refer to this
algorithm as PHB. This algorithm is similar to Algorithm 4 except that each healer
now selects a random backoff delay κ ∈ {1, . . . , η−1} to remain silent after the deploy
of a patch. Upon the expiration of this remaining period, the healer starts sensing
again.
Both PH and PHB have two shortcomings. First, both require to wait until the
end of the learning phase (i.e., a certain observation time T to learn the distribution of
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Algorithm 5: Profile healers with backoff (PHB)
Input Epoch time τ , observation time T such that T > 1 and maximum backoff η
such that η > 1
Initially:
t← 0, ∆← 1, state← LEARNING, next epoch time← 0
Start sensing timer(∆) ⊲ Start timer with duration ∆
Upon the expiration of sensing timer:
t← t+∆
if state = LEARNING then
if t < T then
Record num of neighbors in proximity
else
Estimate threshold from the recorded num of neighbors at each ∆
state← EXECUTION




if current num of neighbors > threshold then
Broadcast a patch
Randomly select κ between (0, η)





Upon the expiration of epoch timer:
t← get current time()
next epoch time← t+ τ
Start sensing timer(∆)
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node arrivals) to start healing the system. Second, the healers learn and estimate the
threshold only once. This may not characterize the node arrival distribution of the
system accurately. Note that any attempts to improve one shortcoming will worsen
the other. For instance, on one hand, decreasing the observation duration T , to start
healing early, introduces the possibility of inaccurately estimating the threshold (due
to insufficient data points) and hence leads to consuming more patches. On the other
hand, if T were to be increased (to better capture the node arrival distribution),
it results in an increased system recovery time. To address these limitations, we
adopt a hybrid approach where healers perform online learning and heal the system
simultaneously. This approach is an extension of the PHB algorithm where each
healer never stops learning. Moreover, at the end of every Γ epochs, each healer
dynamically estimates a new decision threshold based on what it has learned in the
last Γ epochs and uses the newly estimated threshold for the next Γ epochs. We
refer to this algorithm as D-PHB (see Algorithm 6). Note that, unlike both PH and
PHB, each healer can be either in LEARN EXEC state when it both learns and heals or
in ONLY LEARN state when it only learns. However, each D-PHB healer uses random
backoff mechanism like PHB healers.
4.3.6 Family of Prediction Healers
The optimal healer ORACLE (see Algorithm 2) has several advantages compared
to the profile healers. Firstly, an optimal healer has the global view of the entire
network, whereas a profile healer has only the local view (neighbors at its vicinity).
Secondly, an optimal healer can explicitly identify the state (e.g., susceptible, infected,
recovered) of every mobile node, but a profile healer is not capable of identifying the
state of a mobile node in its proximity. Finally, while the former knows the future
(i.e., time instance at which each healer is going to observe the maximum number
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Algorithm 6: Profile healers with backoff and dynamic threshold scheme (D-
PHB)
Input Epoch time τ , observation epochs Γ such that Γ > 1, initial threshold α, and
maximum backoff η such that η > 1
Initially:
t← 0, ∆← 1, next epoch time← τ , state← LEAR EXEC
threshold← α, epoch count← 0, time to switch state← 0
Start sensing timer(∆) ⊲ Start timer with duration ∆
Upon the expiration of sensing timer:
t← t+∆
Record num of neighbors in proximity into Σ
if state = LEAR EXEC then
if current num of neighbors > threshold then
Broadcast a patch
Randomly select κ between (0, η)




if t = next epoch time then
epoch count← epoch count+ 1
if epoch count = Γ then
Estimate threshold from the recorded num of neighbors at each ∆
Clear records from Σ
epoch count← 0
end if
next epoch time← next epoch time+ τ
end if





of infected nodes), the latter has no such knowledge. All these advantages make the
optimal healers ideal, but impractical. Having the first two capabilities of an optimal
healer would make any healer impractical for real world. However, in case of the third
capability, we can equip a healer with the ability to predict the event of observing
relatively higher number of mobile nodes4 in the near future with the goal of hitting
a middle ground between the optimal healers and the profile healers. Therefore, we
propose a new family of healers called prediction healers (PDH).
Similar to a profile healer, each prediction healer can exist in one of the three
states as shown in Fig. 4.9, except it does not estimate a threshold. Instead, each
healer now computes a stationary transition probability matrix 5. Let Xht be the state,
i.e., the total number of mobile nodes observed by the hth healer at time instance t.
Further, assume that the stationary transition probability matrix for the healer h is






t = i], i.e., the probability of observing j
nodes in the next time instance given that the healer has seen i nodes at the current
time instance and n be the total number of mobile nodes in the system6. Each healer
must deploy a patch during every epoch, but it is free to choose the deployment time
instance within an epoch. This deployment time instance is chosen based on whether
it is worth deploying the patch now or to hold off for a better future state that may be
observed within this epoch. If the healer reaches the deadline of the current epoch and
has not deployed the patch yet, it must deploy the patch right away. Each prediction
healer uses a prediction function F which is based on this intuition. We define the




1 if G(λ, x|P) >
∑
y pxyG(λ− 1, y|P)
0 otherwise
4Mobile nodes in general, not only infected ones
5Similar to the transition probability matrix of a Markov Model
6Superscript means the identity of the healer, not the h-step transition probabilities of Markov chain.
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where, λ is the remaining time to the deadline of the current epoch, x is the current
state of the healer, y is any possible next state and y ∈ [0, n], P is the transition




0 if λ < 0
x if λ = 0
max{x,
∑
y pxyG(λ− 1, y|P)} otherwise
Note that G(λ, x|P) ≥ G(λ−1, x|P), for all λ, x. That is, the worth of the patch either
stays the same or diminishes with the decrease in λ (equivalently, with the increase in
time). In other words, the more a healer waits to deploy a patch, the more the patch
loses its worth. Note that it captures the time constraint of the T-Cover problem.
Fig. 4.11 shows the internals of the prediction function where x is the current state
of the healer. In the next time instance, the healer can move to any state j ∈ [0, n]
with probability pxj. The healer predicts the future and decides on whether or not to



















Figure 4.11.: The internals of the prediction function used by a prediction healer
Algorithm 7 describes the healer in detail. During the LEARNING state, each healer
records the number of neighbors observed at each time instance. After the observation
period, each healer computes the transition probability matrix P and stores it for
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Algorithm 7: Prediction Healers (PDH)
Input Epoch length τ , observation time T such that T > 1
Initially:
t← 0, ∆← 1, state← LEARNING, deploy status←false
λ← 0 ⊲ λ is the time to be elapsed until the deadline of the current epoch
Start sensing timer(∆) ⊲ Start timer with duration ∆
Upon the expiration of sensing timer:
t← t+∆
if state = LEARNING then
if t < T then
Record num of neighbors in proximity and store in S
else




else if state = EXECUTION then
λ← λ− 1 ⊲ Elapsed one second
x← current num of neighbors in promixity
if deploy status = false then












future reference. In the EXECUTION state, each healer decides to deploy the patch
if (1) the healer has reached the deadline of the current epoch or (2) it is worth
deploying at the current time instance based on F(λ, x|P). Whenever λ becomes
zero, it performs some reinitialization to prepare itself for the next epoch.
Computing F(λ, x|P) requires a healer to compute the G(.) recursively from λ to
0. Recursive implementations of F(.) and G(.) are highly expensive when the system
contains hundreds of nodes and the epoch length is in the order of minutes. In addi-
tion, recursive implementation wastes computations by solving the same subproblem
multiple times. To overcome these challenges, we leverage dynamic programming, to
efficiently implement G and F . The intuition behind dynamic programming is to
first solve the smaller subproblems and then utilize the answers to solve the overall
problem. The pseudocode for G(.) is shown in Algorithm 8. A healer computes F(.)
in a similar way.
4.4 Healer-Based Protocols Evaluation
In this section, we describe our evaluation methodology and present the perfor-
mance of the various healer-based defense mechanisms outlined in §4.3. Table 4.1
summarizes the notations and the parameters of the healer algorithms that we eval-
uate in the section.
4.4.1 Evaluation Methodology
To evaluate the performance of the families of healers we proposed, we simulate
the various healer-based protocols we described (see Table 4.1) using the NS-3 [104]
network simulator on a network containing 300 nodes. We perform two different sets
of experiments, one with nodes having RWP and the other with TLW as their mo-
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Algorithm 8: Compute G(.)
Input Total number of nodes n, epoch size τ , the transition probability matrix PT
Output A matrix GT of size τ × n
1: Declare a matrix GT of size τ × n
2: for j ← 0 to n
3: GT (0, j)← j
4: end for
5: for i← 1 to τ
6: for j ← 0 to n
7: sum← 0
8: for k ← 0 to n
9: sum← sum+ PT (j, k) ∗GT (i− 1, k)
10: if j > sum then
11: GT (i, j)← j
12: else







bility model. We assume that the range of each healer is 20 meters and the epoch
length, τ , is 30 seconds (so that each node stays within the range of a healer for
one epoch length on an average before leaving the coverage area of the healer). In
addition, 10% of the population is assumed to be initially infected to enable boot-
strapping the system. We can technically start with one infected node (which was our
initial attempt), but we observe that this only delays infection spread and increases
the chance that infection will disappear. Healers are placed in the system using the
strategy outlined in §4.3.3 and are activated (i.e., started) when the fraction of in-
fected nodes exceeds 70% of the total population to give the system sufficient time
to warm-up. We note that 70% is one possible worst case scenario and projects the
capabilities of the healer. In real-world scenarios, this value depends on how fast one
can setup healers during an epidemic outbreak. However, to analyze the sensitivity
of these two parameters on the performance we conducted two-way analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA)7 tests with significance level of 0.05. We varied the number of initially
infected nodes as 10%, 15%, and 20% and the time to activate healers when the 50%,
60%, and 70% of the population become infected. Both the parameters, either with
or without the interaction between them, did not make any statistically significant
impact on the performance. We also conducted pairwise comparison tests amongst
the different categorical values of a parameter to see what significant differences are
present amongst the values of the parameter. For both the parameters, the results
indicate that there are no statistically significant pairwise differences between the
categorical values. Therefore, we choose to proceed with 10% of the nodes as initially
infected and to activate healers when 70% of the nodes becomes infected considering
less aggressive nature in the both the cases.
7In statistics, a two-way ANOVA test is used to examine the influence of different categorical inde-
pendent variables on one dependent variable [165].
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Table 4.1.: List of protocols proposed and evaluated
Protocol Description Parameters (default values)
RHp Randomized healers




MSD =Mean+ 1.5× stddev




Maximum no. of epochs to






Observation epochs Γ (= 10),
maximum no. of epochs to
backoff η (= 2) and decision
threshold M
PDH Prediction healers
Once the healers are activated, they follow the protocols outlined in §4.3.4, §4.3.5,
and §4.3.6. All results are averaged across 10 runs of each experiment, to obtain statis-
tically significant results, by varying the seed of a pseudo-random number generator.
To measure the performance of each protocol, we define:
• Total recovery time: It represents the amount of simulation time required by
the set of healers to recover at least 95% of the nodes in the system.
• Total number of patches : It represents the count of patches deployed by the
set of healers to heal the system such that at least 95% of the total number of
nodes are recovered.
Note that we choose 95% to account for scenarios similar to the rare block prob-
lem [166] in P2P networks - we observe the presence of some infected nodes that take
exceedingly long time to enter the range of healers because they are wandering along

























RWP, Susceptible: 300 nodes
RWP, Infected: 300 nodes
RWP, Recoverd: 300 nodes







TLW, Susceptible: 300 nodes
TLW, Infected: 300 nodes
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TLW, Susceptible: 300 nodes
TLW, Infected: 300 nodes
TLW, Recoverd: 300 nodes
TLW, Oracle: 300 nodes
(b) RH(p=0.5)
Figure 4.12.: Evaluation of Randomized Healer family
4.4.2 Results for Family of Randomized Healers
Fig. 4.12(a) - 4.12(b) show the temporal view of infection propagation and the
recovery of the system for RH family using RWP and TLW. The graphs show that
regardless of the protocol, the required recovery time is always smaller in case of RWP
than TLW which is due to RWP’s higher contact rate.
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Fig. 4.12(a) shows the required recovery time for randomized healers with p = 1,
i.e., RH(p=1). The upper graph is for TLW and the lower one is for RWP. Additionally,
we also point out the recovery time required by ORACLE using a vertical line. In
case of RWP, ORACLE requires 502 seconds to heal the system whereas RH(p=1)
requires almost double this time, i.e., 1,241 seconds. In case of TLW, ORACLE
needs 645 seconds to heal the system whereas RH(p=1) requires about nine times the
optimal recovery time. We also note that the recovery time required by RH(p=1) is
the minimum time that we can achieve using healers that do not depend on system
feedback (e.g., estimating the arrival distribution of nodes).
Fig. 4.12(b) shows the results for RH(p=0.5), i.e., each healer deploys a patch per
epoch with a probability p = 0.5. It is expected thatRH(p=0.5) requires more time than
RH(p=1) to heal the system since now the healers skip some epochs. In comparsion
with the recovery time required by RH(p=1), RH(p=0.5) shows 48% increase in case of
RWP and 31% increase in case of TLW.
4.4.3 Results for Family of Profile Healers
To measure the impact of different maximum backoff values on the PHBMSD and
the PHBM , we varied the maximum backoff from 2 epochs to 16 epochs. Fig. 4.13
shows the results of this experiment. We also include the results of RH(p=1) as a
baseline of the performance. We use two Y-Axes for this graph: the left one for the
total number of patches and the right one for the total recovery time. Each point is the
average of 10 different runs of the simulation and is plotted along its 95% confidence
intervals. With the increase in maximum backoff values, the total recovery time is
increasing rapidly in case of PHBMSD in comparison with PHBM . On the other hand,
the total of number of patches is decreasing rapidly for PHBMSD in comparison with
PHBM . We conjecture that if the recovery time is to be optimized, then PHBM
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is a better solution; but if the energy of the healers is to be optimized, then the
PHBMSD is a better choice. However, the downside of PHB is its large observation
time. D-PHB is a solution to this downside of PHB. We also include the performance
of D-PHBM in Fig. 4.13. The results demonstrate that D-PHBM performs as good as
PHBM in terms of both the metrics. So if the large observation time is unacceptable,











































PHB with MSD: Total patches
PHB with MSD: Recovery time
PHB with M: Total patches
PHB with M: Recovery time
D-PHB with M: Total patches
D-PHB with M: Recovery time
Figure 4.13.: Effect of varying maximum backoff (D-PHBM performs as good as
PHBM in terms of both the metrics with the added advantage that it does not have
an observation time)
LetXMSD andXM represent a profile-based healerX that utilizes MSD(=Mean+
1.5×Standard Deviation) and M(=Median) as its threshold, respectively. Fig. 4.14
shows the performance of PH for the RWP and the TLW mobility models. PHMSD
requires more time to heal the system in comparison with the other two RH healers.
Since we are more interested in the human-mimicking mobility model, we evaluate

























RWP, Susceptible: 300 nodes
RWP, Infected: 300 nodes
RWP, Recoverd: 300 nodes







TLW, Susceptible: 300 nodes
TLW, Infected: 300 nodes
TLW, Recoverd: 300 nodes
TLW, Oracle: 300 nodes
Figure 4.14.: Evaluation of PHMSD
to space limitation, we present the performance of PHB and D-PHB with maximum
backoff η = 2 and M as the threshold value in Fig. 4.15(a)- 4.15(b). When we compare
PHMSD, PHBM , and D-PHBM using the TLW mobility model, PHBM outperforms
the other two in terms of total recovery time.
4.4.4 Results for Family of Prediction Healers
Fig. 4.16 shows the temporal view of the infection propagation and recovery of the
system using prediction healers in case of the TLW mobility model. The prediction
healers require the least amount of time to recover the system when compared to
the RH and PH families. This is due to the prediction capability of the healers that
allow them to deploy patches efficiently. The recovery time required by the prediction
healers is 18% less and 22.5% less than the best random healers RH(p=1) and the best























































(b) D-PHBM with η = 2
Figure 4.15.: Evaluation of various PHM
Summary: Fig. 4.17 summarizes the results consisting of both the metrics obtained
by each of the healers for the TLW mobility model. In terms of the number of patches,
PHMSD requires the least number of patches but at the cost of a larger recovery time.
The prediction healers PDH outperforms the others in terms of the total recovery
time. However, it requires 89% more patches than PHMSD. Next comes the RH(p=1)







































































Figure 4.17.: Summary of the performances of healer families for TLW
recovery, RH(p=1) has to deploy the maximum amount of patches. In fact, PHBM
performs the best since it requires only 29% more recovery time in comparison to
PDH and only 30% more patches than that of PHMSD.
Our results show that each of the schemes has advantages and disadvantages.
First, randomized healers offer the immediate advantage that they do not rely on
system feedback nor do they have to learn the system before starting to recover the
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system. Second, prediction healers would be beneficial in a time-constrained system
as these healers are fastest at recovering an infected system by utilizing prediction
capability. However, they result in using 1.8x patches than the profile healers (with
MSD threshold). Finally, profile healers with backoff offer intelligent decision making
thereby saving energy in the form of utilizing less number of patches and would benefit
the most in an energy-constrained environment. However, they result in taking 1.8x
time to recover in comparison to PDH healers. On the other hand, when compared
with the ORACLE, we observe that PDH, RH, and PHBM healers take 7.4x, 9x, and
9.5x recovery time, respectively. Furthermore, to recover the system PHMSD healers
require 2.5x patches than the ORACLE.
4.5 Summary
Mobile malware have become an emerging problem that threatens smartphones
which are growing significantly in recent days. In this work, we considered realistic
mobility patterns to model proximity dependent malware and compared them against
de facto models like random waypoint mobility model. We presented several defense
mechanisms that allow tuning of parameters to control the optimization along two
dimensions: time to recovery and energy utilized. The extensive evaluation of all our
defense mechanisms shows that prediction healers would be more effective in a time




The related work for Chapters 2, 3, and 4 is discussed here. For clarity, we present
the related work on compliance checking, adversarial testing, and infection mitigation
in Section 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, respectively.
5.1 Compliance Checking
We now outline the previous work that are closely related to our compliance
checking work by grouping them into different categories.
Software model checking Formally proving that a program satisfies some prop-
erties has been considered an important problem [167,168]. Software model checking
can be roughly divided into the following categories: execution-based [13, 169, 170]
and abstraction-based techniques [14, 171]. Counterexample-guided abstraction re-
finement (CEGAR) [55] exploits the best of the above two approaches by automati-
cally generating the abstractions of the program under verification and refining when
a spurious counterexample is encountered. CEGAR ensures that the abstract state
space of the program is small enough to be searched efficiently. Many automatic tools
that use some form of CEGAR, e.g., SLAM [16], BLAST [17], CPACHECKER [15]
have been proposed. In spirit, our compliance checking technique uses the CEGAR
approach. While, the above tools are used for verifying general program, CHIRON is
targeted towards checking compliance of event-driven network protocols and hence we
can use protocol specific optimizations for compliance checking. Jaffar et al. [172] ex-
ploits symbolic execution and interpolants to learn infeasible paths and hence avoids
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exploring an exponential number of paths. The above analysis techniques can im-
prove CHIRON’s precision and scalability while extracting the E-FSM. Gulavani
et al. [173] proposes a new property checking algorithm that combines the ideas of
counterexample-guided model checking, directed testing, and partition refinement.
Verifying network protocols and event-driven programs Holzmann et al. [19]
extract the abstract event-driven program model from a source code using a purely
syntactic approach, which requires the end user to annotate the source code heavily.
The extracted model is later model checked against the given properties after har-
nessing the model further by utilizing the user provided map of source statements
relevant to the verification to be performed and the user provided test driver to sim-
ulate the necessary behaviors to interact with the application. Our approach uses
symbolic execution and requires significantly less developer inputs to automatically
extract the E-FSM of the protocol.
The work by Musuvathi et al. [18,20] is the closest to our approach. They develop
an explicit state model checker for C/C++ source CMC that verifies user-provided
invariants. CHIRON differs from CMC in the following four ways: (1) CHIRON
uses pLTL to express properties whereas CMC uses boolean formulas, (2) CHIRON
explicitly extracts the E-FSM whereas CMC generates parts of the E-FSM as nec-
essary for verification, (3) CHIRON uses a symbolic model checker whereas CMC is
an explicit-state model checker, (4) CMC focuses on low-level programming errors
whereas we are focused on detecting logical programming errors while implementing
the S-FSM. Clarke et al. [174] propose a specialized model checker for security pro-
tocols. However, the protocol is required to be expressed in their high level language.
CHIRON works on the C source of the protocol. Chaki and Datta [175] combine
software model checking with standard protocol security model to verify authentica-
tion and secrecy properties of protocol. They require the source to be ported to their
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language ASPIRE. CHIRON’s FSM extractor directly works on the source and does
not emphasize on authentication or secrecy. Bhargavan et al. [99] uses SPIN [13] and
HOL theorem prover [176] to prove key properties of distance vector routing proto-
cols standards. However, their approach cannot handle protocol implementations.
Bhargavan et al. [177] advocate the automatic extraction and verification of symbolic
cryptographic models from executable code; however, they require the implementa-
tion to be in specific language (i.e., F#).
Counterexample guided testing Counterexamples have been used as test inputs
to test non-trivial properties [66,67]. The basic idea is generating a model and testing
it against some well-formed property. If the property is violated, the CEX is used to
generate tests for the program. CHIRON’s automatic extraction of the E-FSM of
the protocol can help generate more targeted and non-trivial test cases from the CEX.
Inferring protocol specification Several other works have looked at inferring
protocol specification— based on network traces [57–59,178,179], using program anal-
ysis [60, 61, 180, 181], or through model checking [14, 62]. Comparetti et al. [57] infer
protocol state machines from observed network traces by clustering messages based
on the similarity of message contents and their reaction to the execution. While
Caballero et al. [58] extracts the protocol message format from a trace of protocol
messages, Cho et al. [59] extracts the protocol state machines from network traces
with the help of a set of user-provided abstraction functions to generate an abstract
alphabet out of trace messages. However, the protocol state machines extracted fol-
lowing these techniques merely capture the sequences of messages that represent valid
sessions of the protocol, which often remains incomplete as it depends on the captured
network traces and does not possibly represent the actual protocol FSM.
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On the other hand, MACE [61] infers the abstract model given a seed of protocol
messages by constructing an abstract grammar and performs concolic execution on
the protocol binary to discover vulnerabilities, while iteratively refining the model as
it encounters new input/output messages. Unlike MACE, our work does not rely on
any seed of messages and extract the actual FSM implemented by the protocol rather
than a state machine depicting the sequence of messages of a valid session. Kothari et
al. [60] employs symbolic execution to derive the FSM from TinyOS programs. How-
ever, the FSM is built from the program states representing a very low-level program
state machine rather than the protocol FSM. Whereas our work focuses on extracting
the high-level protocol FSM from the C-based implementation of the protocol. Sim-
ilarly, Lie et al. [62] uses a source-to-source transformation procedure that translates
the protocol implementation (C code) to the modeling language (metal) for the model
checker (Murphi). In addition, it requires the end users to annotate the protocol code
in the metal language, which will be used to slice the selected protocol code from the
large code base. The users also need to provide a list of translation patterns to be
used to translate the sliced- program AST into model checking language. The ex-
tracted model combined with user provided hardware model are used to model check
against the specified correctness properties. Whereas our technique is much richer in
a sense that we extract a high-level protocol FSM, not the program FSM, by using
utilizing program analysis rather than source-to-source transformation. Additionally,
our technique is independent of the modeling language and the model checker one
uses for verification.
Vulnerability discovery in network protocols A variety of works focus on find-
ing vulnerability in network protocol implementations, many using fuzzing. While
random fuzz testing [182] is often effective in finding interesting corner case errors,
the probability of “hitting the jackpot” is substantially low because it typically mu-
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tates the well-formed inputs and tests the program on the resulting inputs. To over-
come this inherent problem of fuzzing, a set of works like SNOOZE [63], KiF [64],
SNAKE [65] leverage protocol state machine to cover deeper and more relevant por-
tions of the search space. All of them require the end users to provide the protocol
specification (e.g., message format, state machine) and various fault injection scenar-
ios or evaluation metric to discover vulnerabilities in stateful protocols such as SIP
and transport protocols. On the contrary, several works like MACE [61], Prospex [57]
infer protocol models (a sequence of messages valid in a session) to be used for fuzzing
to discover vulnerabilities. Our work orthogonally focuses on checking compliance of
high-level properties in protocol implementations, which may lead to discovery of
state machine bugs.
Several other works [31,183–185] leverage program analysis, for example, symbolic
execution, to find vulnerabilities in protocol implementations. MAX [31] focuses on
two-party protocols to find performance attacks mounted by a compromised partici-
pant that can manipulate the victim’s execution control flow. However, MAX relies
on the user specified information about a known vulnerability of the implementation
to limit the search space during symbolic execution. Similarly, SymbexNet [183] tests
two-party protocols by executing one party symbolically to operate on symbolically
marked input packets. Thus it can generate high-coverage test input packets for the
implementation, which are verified against the packet rules manually derived from
the specification. Unlike them, KleeNet [184] and SDE [186] apply symbolic execu-
tion to network protocols and distributed systems, respectively. The key idea is to
spawn a symbolic execution instance for each participant and allow communication
between the symbolic states of different participants as if they were exchange mes-
sages through network packets. Besides low-level programming errors, it allows the
end users to check simple high-level properties by providing global assertions.
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General bug finding tools There is a rich literature (e.g., DART [187], CUTE [188],
KLEE [77], EXE [189], BitBlaze [190], S2E [191]) on general bug finding tools that
employ symbolic execution. Some (e.g., DART, CUTE, SAGE) are built on the
concept of concolic execution – which concretely runs a single execution path and
collects and solves symbolic constraints to drive the concrete execution to the next
path, whereas others (e.g., KLEE, S2E, EXE) try to execute all possible paths in a
single run of the system. These techniques have been effectively used to find bugs
or to generate exploits in sequential programs such as Unix utilities. Such bugs of-
ten manifest due to low-level programming errors (e.g., segmentation faults, various
memory errors due to read/write overflows). While such tools allow the end users to
specify invariants in the code using special code construct, such code constructs are
not always sufficient to check complex and intricate invariants (e.g., state transition
due to a specific network event) as they require additional code to extract the protocol
state and perform invariants checking, which further increases the burden on the end
users (or the verifier). However, without negating the necessity of those techniques,
we intend to find if the implementation under test violates any given high-level pro-
tocol properties thereby complementing the general bug finding tools that focus on
low-level errors.
5.2 Adversarial Testing
Model checking techniques [13, 192, 193] have been used to verify the correctness
of protocol models. Once the model is specified in a high-level modeling language,
its correctness is verified mathematically. Many works extended such methods to
consider the wireless environment [98,99,194,195]. While model checking techniques
have been helpful to show the correctness of the model of a protocol, the high-level
descriptions abstract away many details of the actual implementation resulting in
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missing vulnerabilities in the abstract model, which may manifest in the actual im-
plementation. Exploration based model checking techniques [18, 20, 170, 196] apply
model checking directly on implementations. Specifically, CMC [18] has been applied
on different implementations of the AODV protocol, but requires the implementations
to be ported to its specialized runtime environment.
Without denying the benefit of model checking, our work is orthogonally different
since we focus on bugs/attacks that impair the performance of the protocol in actual
executions of the implementation. In addition, one can argue to establish ground truth
using model checking or using formally verified reference implementation like [197].
However, note that being able to model check liveness and performance properties is
a challenging problem, and to the best of our knowledge, the existing model checking
techniques cannot be used to check performance properties. Also, to the best of our
knowledge, there are no verified reference implementation for the protocols we tested.
Systematic fault injection is another popular method to improve software robust-
ness [198,199]. Unlike model checking or symbolic execution, fault injection focuses
on exceptional behavior of software by injecting faults. However, such works do not
consider adversarial environments as ours where we inject malicious faults that are
tailored to imitate attackers.
Several network emulation tools have been developed, for example, NIST Net [200],
DummyNet [201], catering wired networks and Emulab [108], Orbit [110], Mobi-
Net [109] catering wireless networks. Some of them even support emulation of network
faults while testing various network protocols. Conceptually, these tools, at least the
ones designed for wireless networks, could replace the NS-3 network emulator and the
virtualization-based nodes. However, such tools would require the user to provide a
separate (and malicious) implementation of the routing protocol under test and that
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is for each adversary in the network. Whereas, we do not require any such malicious
version of the protocol under test.
There have been some recent effort on finding attacks automatically in imple-
mentations [30–32, 102]. Kothari et al. [31] automatically find attacks that manip-
ulate control flow by modifying messages using static analysis by relying on a priori
knowledge about vulnerability. Stanojevic et al. [32] automatically search for gulli-
bility in two-party protocols by leveraging a variety of techniques: packet-dropping
and packet header modifications. Lee et al. [30] automatically discover performance
attacks caused by insiders in distributed systems without requiring instrumented im-
plementation. All these works except [102] require the implementation to be written
in a specific language.
5.3 Infection Mitigation
We divide the previous works related to our infection mitigation work into two
groups. In the first group, we discuss related work in the area of mathematical mod-
eling and analysis of worms and viral epidemics. We then move on to discussing the
existing works on controlling the worm propagation.
Epidemic models. Wired networks have been the focus of most literature on worm
propagation. A comprehensive overview of major malware outbreaks in networks
with a discussion of their trends is given in [202]. There are two popular models
that are generally used to describe worm propagation: deterministic [49–51, 203–
207] and stochastic [208, 209] epidemiological models. Staniford et al. [205] use the
SIR epidemiological model to capture the effects of human countermeasures and the
congestion due to the worm spread. Shen et al. [210] provide a discrete-time worm
model that considers patching, cleaning and certain local scanning techniques. All
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these approaches abstract network topology and change in the size of vulnerable
population as the worm spreads. Theodorakopoulos et al. [211] take deterministic
modeling one step further and combine it with a game theoretic process that involves
learning. A probabilistic queueing framework has been proposed in [212] to model
the spread of mobile viruses using short range wireless interfaces (e.g., Bluetooth)
of mobile devices. While similar in spirit, our work focuses on modeling infection
dynamics in MANETs as a function of the mobility models.
Peng et al. [213] propose a two-dimensional cellular automata to characterize the
propagation dynamics of worms in smartphones. Their scheme integrates an infec-
tion factor evaluate the spread degree of infected nodes, and a resistance factor to
evaluate the degree that susceptible nodes resist. Wang et al. [214] deploy agents in
the form of hidden contacts on the device to capture messages sent from malicious
applications. The authors combine these captured messages in conjunction with a
latent space model to estimate the current dynamics of the system and use this to
predict the future state of malware propagation within the mobility network. Our
work is complementary to these efforts in that our decentralized algorithms can utilize
their models during the learning phase. Szongott et al. [215] present a prototype of a
replicating mobile malware that spreads from device to device in downtown Chicago.
Using simulations, they show that smartphones create a viable substrate for epidemic
mobile malware. Our work differs from them in two key aspects. First, unlike them,
we use a more realistic truncated levy walk mobility model. Second, they only study
infection propagation whereas we propose several algorithms for recovery.
Worm containment. There have been some works in controlling the spread of
worms inside a wireless network [52, 144, 145, 216–218]. Williamson et al. [216]
present a technique to limit the rate of connections to “new” machines. This is effec-
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tive at both slowing and halting virus propagation without affecting normal traffic.
Their work is based on heuristics and simulations which consider a static choice of
reduced communication rate. Wong et al. [217] present a technique that relies on
limiting the contact rate of worm traffic. Specifically, they investigate rate control at
individual end hosts and at the edge and backbone routers, for both random propaga-
tion and local-preferential worms. They show that both host and edge-router based
rate control result in a slowdown that is linear to the number of hosts implementing
the rate limiting filter.
More recently, Barbera et al. [219] consider the problem of computing an efficient
patching strategy to stop worm spreading between smartphones. They consider cases
where the worm spreads between the devices and where the worm attacks the cloud
before moving to the device. Tang et al. [220] propose distributing patches to certain
key nodes so they can opportunistically disseminate them to the rest of the network.
In their work, they present a predictive mobile malware containment system where
devices collect co-location data in a decentralized manner and report to a central
server which processes and targets delivery of hot fixes to a small subset of k devices
at runtime. In contrast, our work does not assume a central server and all our
algorithms are fully decentralized.
Cole et al. [218] present both analytic and simulation analysis of worm propa-
gation focusing specifically on the features of a tactical, battlefield MANETs which
are unique to a defense environment. Their goal was to develop an accurate set
of performance requirements on potential mitigation techniques of worm propaga-
tion for such MANETs. Zou et al. [221] compare email worm propagation on three
topologies: power law, small world, and random graph topologies; and then study
how the topology affects immunization defense on email worms. Their email worm
model includes the effect of human interactions. Yang et al. [222] utilize a software
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diversity approach to deal with the spread of worm in wireless sensor networks. Zhu
et al. [223] take into account the social relationship of mobile users to contain MMS
worms within a limited range in cellular networks. Unlike them, we introduce a suite




Given the importance of the emerging wireless networks, it is essential to ensure their
secure and reliable operations, which calls for both pre- and post-deployment mea-
sures. Pre-deployment measures are great for proactively identifying and fixing errors
in the protocol implementations, thereby gaining confidence in the implementations.
In contrast, post-deployment measures are crucial for addressing the aftermath of a
security attack through rapid containment of the infection while reducing the recov-
ery time and costs. This dissertation provides novel techniques to fortifying these
wireless networks through specification compliance checking and adversarial testing
of protocol implementations before deployment, and through infection mitigation at
the event of attack after deployment.
Checking implementations for specification compliance using the existing tools
is a painstakingly challenging task as they often require extensive manual efforts to
specify the model that is checked against the desired properties and suffer from im-
precisions due to the underlying syntactic approaches. In this regard, our work on
compliance checking, CHIRON, has filled a vital gap by extracting the FSM of the
protocol automatically from the source code of the given implementation by symbol-
ically executing the code while requiring a little input from the developer. CHIRON
then follows a model-checking approach utilizing a symbolic model checker to check
if each of the desired properties is valid against the extracted FSM. In case of any vi-
olations, the model checker generated counterexamples undergo CHIRON’s two-step
validation process to rule out the false positives.
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We provide a concrete implementation of CHIRON on top of KLEE. To demon-
strate the effectiveness of CHIRON, we applied it to 5 protocol implementations and
uncovered 10 instance of non-compliances having security, interoperability, and per-
formance implications. Using traditional testing approaches (e.g., manual testing,
random fuzz testing, unit testing), some of these non-compliances can easily remain
undetected as they would require the developer to imagine those subtle and intricate
sequences of actions to drive the implementations follow some relatively rare execution
paths. On the contrary, we discovered these non-compliances using CHIRON with a
very little effort and time. Therefore, we conclude that CHIRON can expedite the
process of developing specification compliant implementations of network protocols.
Having a specification compliant implementation does not necessarily provide ro-
bustness to attacks mounted by compromised nodes in an adversarial environment.
Therefore, we proposed Turret-W, an adversarial testing platform to automatically
test wireless routing protocol implementations. Turret-W uses a network emulator
and virtualization to test unmodified protocol implementations beyond their basic
functionalities. Besides general attacks against routing, Turret-W can test various
wireless specific attacks.
By using Turret-W on 5 routing protocol implementations, we discovered 37 at-
tacks capable of either impeding the availability by crashing the benign nodes or
reducing their performance by disrupting the routing service, and 3 implementation
bugs that impair the protocol performance even in a benign environment. To the
best of our knowledge, all these bugs and 5 of the total attacks were not previously
reported. Given the significance of routing as a fundamental component of wireless
networks, we concentrated on the routing protocol implementations in our work of
Turret-W. However, it can easily be extended for the protocols operated on the other
143
layers of the network stack. Therefore, we consider that Turret-W can be applied to
greatly improve the robustness of various network protocol implementations.
With the evidence of malware capable of propagating through proximity-based
communication (e.g., Bluetooth, NFC), the aftermath of such attacks demands for
reactive measures—specific to these networks—to contain the infection and reduce
the impacts. In our infection mitigation work, we model the propagation of such mal-
ware amongst humans carrying smartphones using epidemiology theory and study the
problem as a function of the underlying mobility models. We improve the state-of-the-
art by taking into account realistic mobility patterns to model proximity dependent
malware as opposed to using the de facto mobility models like random waypoint mo-
bility model. Since the optimal approach to heal an infected network using a set of
static healers is an NP-Complete problem, we provide three families of healer proto-
cols that allow tuning of parameters to control the optimization along two dimensions:
time to recovery and energy utilized. We were very thorough in evaluating the de-
fense mechanisms, i.e., the healer protocols. We observe that the profile healers would
benefit the most in an energy constrained environment while the prediction healers
would be more effective in a time constrained environment.
Future work. There are several compelling directions to pursue for future work.
First, CHIRON requires the properties to be derived manually from the specifications
and written in pLTL format. Automating this process is challenging as it involves
semantic parsing of the protocol specifications written in natural languages (e.g.,
English). To tackle this problem, one can leverage well-studied natural language
processing techniques. Second, the adversarial testing with Turret-W can be improved
by guiding the search of the attack-space using high-coverage test input packets. To
tackle this problem, one can leverage some white-box testing techniques to eliminate
redundant test input packets and to guide the search toward previously unexplored
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execution paths. Finally, in our infection mitigation work, we only provide empirically
evaluation of the proposed defense mechanisms through simulation. One can perform
complexity analysis to achieve theoretical bounds on those defense mechanisms. This
problem is challenging as it requires to take into account some extraneous factors
inherent to these mobile networks such as the mobility aspects and the transmission
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